THE DOUBLE DISADVANTAGE: A THEORY OF STATUS, STIGMA, AND MORAL EXPECTATIONS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 6.6. Mediated Moderation Model Path Diagram for Salary

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how the combined effects of status characteristics and social stigmas diminish outcomes for individuals. Research in the status characteristics theoretical tradition (SCT) has produced leading explanations of how status characteristics like race and gender invoke differential performance expectations that lead to unequal outcomes in the workplace, schools, and other settings. Likewise, various studies illustrate how stigmas such as criminal history and mental illness diminish outcomes in employment, housing, and treatment. Although the processes that lead to disadvantage related to each characteristic have been well researched, there has been no systematic, integrative investigation of how status and stigma might operate in conjunction to intensify disadvantage for individuals – as has been shown to occur in a series of fragmented, case-based studies.

This study develops a preliminary theoretical framework to attempt to explain the empirical patterns that suggest this status-stigma intensification effect. Although substantive research suggests that being status-disadvantaged and also stigmatized magnifies bias and discrimination, these patterns are at odds with the literatures most closely associated with status characteristics and stigmas. Drawing on each of these literatures – SCT and theories of stigma – I suggest a new, integrative theory to better link the two concepts and resolve divergences between status and stigma processes.

Specifically, this research argues that the moral expectations infused in stigmas will activate low moral expectations associated with devalued states of status characteristics, resulting in the intensification effect. SCT has established that status characteristics invoke performance expectations, which influence outcomes. Moral

expectations, however, have not yet been considered within the theory. I explore this relationship in two experiments designed to test the potential status-stigma interaction and the mediating effects of moral and performance expectations using participant evaluations within a mock-hiring scenario across two cases: race/criminal history and gender/mental illness.

Results from the two experiments provide preliminary support for a general status-stigma interaction effect. Further, results provide support for the mediating role of moral expectations in the relationship between the status-stigma interaction and workplace outcomes. That is – for both race/criminal history and gender/mental illness – I find that having a devalued status state and a stigma results in more negative work-related evaluations and outcomes and that these evaluations are mediated by moral expectations. Contrary to my predictions and to central tenets of SCT, however, there are no status effects of either race or gender in the absence of stigma, and performance expectations do not mediate the status-stigma interaction on workplace outcomes.

These findings lay the foundation for a synthetic theory that resolves certain divergences between status and stigma processes. In particular, there is compelling preliminary evidence for two new theoretical tenets that may guide the aggregation of status and stigmatized characteristics: a general interaction effect and the mediating role of moral expectations. As this study identifies moral expectations as a new mechanism of status and stigma-related bias, it also suggests fruitful new avenues for targeted interventionist efforts to reduce discrimination. However, this study should be viewed as a first step in the exploration of concerns that span the status and stigma literatures. More

general conclusions about the applicability and scope of the framework developed here will depend on future research that examines additional sets of characteristics.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Just two decades ago, Nobel Prize winning economist James Heckman famously called discrimination – racial and gender discrimination in particular – a "problem of an earlier era" (1998:102). With the introduction of "color blind" policies and affirmative action, this idea was taking hold more broadly in the United States as well. In 2003, however, sociologist Devah Pager published what is likely one of the most important and influential studies in the discipline, if not in the social sciences as a whole. In her pioneering study, "The Mark of a Criminal Record" (2003), she showed that discrimination was alive and well. With a simply designed experimental audit study, she enlisted two pairs of young men – one black and one white, and within those pairs, one with a criminal history and one without – to pose as equally qualified job seekers. Findings revealed dramatic racial bias in hiring and that these disparities were compounded by the lingering stigma of a criminal record. With no criminal record, white applicants were more than twice as likely as black applicants to receive a callback from an employer. In fact, black applicants with a clean record got a callback less often than white applicants *with a criminal record.* And black applicants with a criminal record fared the worst: receiving a callback only 5% of the time.

Devah Pager and others (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Moss and Tilly 2001; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009) shone a spotlight on the persistence of deep-seated bias and discrimination in the United States. Though these patterns of inequality should not have been surprising, this work was some of the first of its kind to empirically demonstrate the extent to which a racial status-disadvantage (such as being black) combined with a social stigma (such as criminal

history) could intensify bias. Consequently, this research has been highly influential both in academia and in the public sphere. Pager's (2003) study, for instance, has spawned a virtual research program on the effects of race and criminal history on labor market outcomes. It has also had a profound impact on public policy. In 2004, then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean began citing the study in his campaign speeches, and it was used as part of the Bush administration's motivation to allocate $300 million to help formerly incarcerated individuals navigate the labor market.

Most recently, this vein of research has also helped to motivate new "ban the box" policies. These policies have diffused widely across US cities, restricting employers from asking about criminal records on early-stage job applications. But while "ban the box" has been hailed as a progressive and necessary measure, it has had unintended consequences. Shortly after the policy's initial implementation, an assessment by Doleac and Hansen (2016) found that "there is rapidly-increasing evidence that [banning the box] has unintentionally done more harm than good when it comes to helping disadvantaged job-seekers find jobs." Their study suggested that discrimination against black and other minority offenders had actually *increased* with the adoption of these policies. It is likely that employers, when equipped with less information about applicants, rely more upon assumptions and shared cultural beliefs about criminality minority applicants – resulting in more discrimination against minorities as a whole (Doleac and Hansen 2016, Agan and Starr 2016).

The implications of the "ban the box" failure are clear: identifying patterns of discrimination is not enough. To go about solving these widespread social problems, we must also examine the precise mechanisms that motivate these biases. Despite the large

body of research that identifies certain constellations of characteristics that intensify bias, there is comparatively less that focuses on how exactly certain characteristics combine, whether there may be general processes that govern how they intersect, and the mechanisms that drive this sort of "double disadvantage." In the case I have discussed throughout this introduction, it is likely that there is something about the way that culturally charged characteristics like race and criminal history interact that produces extreme patterns of inequality; and more specifically – for black ex-offenders – something about the way that moralized perceptions of criminality interlock with beliefs associated with blackness to produce different levels of disadvantage. Further, it is possible that a more precise understanding of this intersection might help in understanding how other, similar types of attributes diminish outcomes for individuals.

This dissertation attempts to unpack what is going on in a case like this. Is this "double disadvantage" a general phenomenon? Why exactly do social characteristics like these magnify disadvantage for individuals to such a strong degree? Without answers to these questions, it is likely that even research-informed interventions – like "Ban the Box" – will fail. To begin to answer these questions, we must first explicitly define the types of characteristics in question – a step often missed even by those who study cases where different social attributes combine to cause combinatorial disadvantage. I use the status and stigma literatures in social psychology to illustrate that cases like the race and criminal history example I have relied on here involve two different types of social characteristics: status characteristics and social stigmas. In the remainder of this introduction, I use the literatures associated with these concepts to illuminate problems in understanding this "double disadvantage." Specifically, I make the case that theories of

status and stigma lead to inconsistent, and perhaps incorrect, predictions about how the two types of characteristics combine to affect outcomes. I then discuss how these inconsistencies are relevant to other cases. Finally, I use the theoretical puzzle that arises from considering the interactive effects of status and stigma to discuss the core motivations and questions that guide this dissertation.

Understanding the "Double Disadvantage"

Understanding micro-level sources of inequality is of chief concern to social psychologists in sociology. Status and stigma are two such sources that have produced prominent, but distinct strands of research within social psychology. Status characteristics theory (SCT) – arguably the core theory within expectation states theory (EST) – has developed leading explanations of how status characteristics like race and gender invoke differential performance expectations, which lead to unequal outcomes in schools, the workplace, and other settings (Cohen & Roper 1972, Correll et al. 2007). The stigma literature is not guided by the same type of overarching theoretical framework as EST, but has produced an array of studies that illustrate how social stigmas like criminal history and mental illness dramatically diminish outcomes in such spheres as employment, housing, and treatment (Link & Phelan 2001, Lucas & Phelan 2012, Corrigan 2000).

Although both literatures have produced fruitful bodies of research on how individual attributes affect outcomes through associated cultural beliefs, there has been little crossover between the two (for two notable exceptions, see Lucas & Phelan 2012 and Phelan et al. 2014). This study examines how status organizing processes and

stigmatization processes relate, beginning at a point of potential divergence. More specifically, it considers how devalued states of status characteristics (being black as opposed to being white or being female as opposed to being male) and stigmatized characteristics (such as having a criminal record or a mental illness) combine in relation to SCT's aggregation assumption – an area where the two strands have not yet been examined together. SCT assumes that individuals construct aggregate expectations of competence when confronted with multiple, and sometimes inconsistent, status characteristics. The aggregation of expectations is subject to two effects: 1) attenuation (additional consistent characteristics have declining marginal impact in the construction of expectations) and 2) inconsistency (inconsistent characteristics are accorded more weight in the construction of expectations). If stigmatized characteristics followed these status order processes, we would expect that a stigma would be relatively *less* disadvantageous when paired with devalued status characteristics and relatively *more* disadvantageous when paired with valued status characteristics. Take the stigma of criminal history and the status characteristic of race, for instance. Status order logic would predict that having a criminal history would be relatively *more* of a disadvantage for a white male than for a black male. It would predict a similar relationship with other like-pairings such as gender and mental illness – a mental illness would be relatively *more* of a disadvantage for a male than for a female.

There is little empirical support for these predictions, however. Numerous substantive studies, specifically focused on this issue, suggest that status and stigmatized characteristics combine in the opposite fashion of the status processes described above. Devah Pager's (2007) groundbreaking work on the stigma of a criminal record provides a

compelling illustration of the differences in status and stigmatization processes. The results of her audit study, which tested the relative disadvantage of a criminal record for black and white job applicants, shows that black offenders experienced an "intensification of stigma" – i.e. the disadvantage produced was larger than the combined effects of each characteristic on its own. Wirth and Bodenhausen (2009) find the same sort of intensification of disadvantage in their experimental study on the role of gender in mental illness stigma: females who exhibit gender-typical psychological disorders elicit harsher, more negative judgments. This intensification effect stands in conflict with SCT's aggregation assumption, suggesting that these characteristics, when combined, do not follow status order processes.

Why do these status-stigma combinations magnify negative evaluations of individuals to such a strong degree? In this dissertation, I propose that the intensely moral nature of stigma triggers underlying moral dimensions of status characteristics. SCT has established that status characteristics invoke performance expectations that affect outcomes. What it has not yet considered are other types of expectations that might arise when these characteristics are paired with other attributes, like stigmas. Status characteristics – race and gender in particular – are complex cultural constructs associated with an array of different meanings. They do not only serve as indicators of competence, but are also infused with shared beliefs about morality and character. This project begins with the proposition that certain types of stigmas activate moral dimensions of devalued status characteristics, resulting in an intensified "interactional disadvantage" (Driskell 1982, Ridgeway 1982).

This dissertation employs an experimental approach to examine the status-stigma intensification and the mechanisms that produce it. More specifically, I use two laboratory experiments to examine how the relationship I have discussed applies to two different status-stigma pairings. Experimental methods allow me to begin to examine whether the intensification of devalued status and stigma is a general phenomenon, which holds across a variety of characteristics. It may be that the effect is related to particular status characteristics and particular stigmas, which could then be examined further in this research. In addition to establishing preliminary support for a general status-stigma interaction, I also examine moral expectations as a new theoretical mechanism driving the intensification, along with performance expectations. Identifying the mechanism will aid in the construction of a general theoretical principle regarding how status and stigmatized characteristics operate in conjunction. While some existing research provides rich insight into particular cases where devalued statuses and social stigmas combine, the goal of this portion of my dissertation is to lay preliminary groundwork for a research program that examines *general* properties of status and stigma and to construct a new formal theoretical principle regarding how status and stigma operate together. To test my predictions, I use two controlled laboratory experiments in an effort to diminish case-specific "noise." The experiments test for the predicted intensification effect, and predicted mechanisms, of two status-stigma pairings: race/criminal history and gender/mental illness. Each experiment uses a mock-hiring scenario where participants evaluate mock, but ostensibly real job candidates who vary on the characteristics of interest on several work-related outcomes. The workplace scenario is used in the experiments because the labor market is a highly consequential sphere where status

characteristics and social stigmas can become highly salient, and can, in turn, affect individual outcomes (Moss & Tilly 1996, 2001; Lamont 2002; Pager 2007, Correll et al. 2007).

This dissertation brings the social psychological literature on status processes in closer dialogue with that on processes of stigmatization. Testing and reconciling divergences between these processes will contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the concepts of status and stigma individually, and how they operate together. This work also speaks to general sociological inquiry on social inequality and discrimination on the bases of race, criminal history, gender, and mental illness. And most importantly, understanding what produces intensified disadvantage is the first step in developing targeted interventionist strategies for relieving inequalities and mitigating roadblocks that obstruct achievement and success among some of the most marginalized individuals in the United States: those who are both status-disadvantaged *and* stigmatized.

Outline of the Dissertation

In what follows, I use literatures on status – particularly that on status characteristics theory within the expectation states tradition – and stigma to develop a theoretical argument about status-stigma interaction and the role of moral expectations and to specify both experimental and qualitative investigations of this new, integrative theory. In chapter 2, I define and differentiate status characteristics and stigmas respectively. I use the literatures associated with each – along with related substantive research on particular characteristics that are illustrative of the assumptions underlying this dissertation – to show how they diverge in their processes and the ways they produce

inequalities among individuals. From this analysis, I argue that the divergences between status and stigma processes suggest that the characteristics should be treated and studied as analytically distinct concepts. In Chapter 3, I advance my theoretical argument for why stigmatized characteristics diverge from status organizing processes. Given the moral nature of stigmatized attributes, I argue that social stigmas activate different types of expectations that have not been considered within status characteristics theory, moral expectations in particular. I explore the idea that stigmas like criminal history and mental illness evoke strong, negative cultural beliefs about an individual's moral character, and that these beliefs activate underlying moral dimensions of status characteristics such as race and gender. These expectations of moral character work alongside the performance expectations associated with status, and with stigma as well, to affect the way that status and stigmatized characteristics interlock in a way that intensifies disadvantage. In the final section of chapter 3, I outline my research strategy for examining this theoretical argument, and develop specific predictions from the previous chapters about the general processes that might govern how status and stigma operate in conjunction.

From my overarching research strategy, hypotheses, and expectations that guide the study as a whole, I then move to the empirical investigation. Starting in chapter 4, I describe the experimental tests of the predicted status-stigma intensification and the mediating role of moral and performance expectations. This chapter provides an overview of the experimental methodology, design, and analytic approach used in the two experiments. Experiment 1 provides a test of the status-stigma pairing of race and criminal history, and Experiment 2 provides a test of the status-stigma pairing of gender and mental illness. Chapters 5 and 6 present the results from Experiment 1 and

Experiment 2 respectively. In Chapter 7, I discuss the results of both experiments with respect to my hypotheses and how they advance and complicate the integrative theory I have proposed. Finally, in Chapter 8, I close by discussing the broader implications of the argument advanced throughout the study in light of my findings.

CHAPTER 2: DEFINING STATUS AND STIGMA

The goal of this dissertation is to understand how status and stigma interact to diminish outcomes for individuals across social contexts, but particularly in the workplace, for people who are both status-disadvantaged and stigmatized. In this chapter, I draw on the status and stigma literatures respectively to assess what we know about these characteristics, and how they operate as axes of inequality among individuals. The few studies that have attempted to integrate the literatures related to status and stigma leave open the question of whether these characteristics are analytically distinct (Lucas and Phelan 2012, Link et al. 2014). Thus I review the literature with an eye toward explicitly defining and distinguishing status characteristics and social stigmas as concepts.

Status Characteristics Theory

Status characteristics theory (Berger et al. 1977) explains how attributes of individuals come to reflect their rank in status hierarchies, becoming sources of inequality. These attributes, or *status characteristics*, are endowed with shared cultural beliefs that link one state of the characteristic with greater worthiness or competence than another. The logic of the theory holds that actors (often unconsciously) use the associated cultural beliefs or *status beliefs* to construct differential expectations for task performance, which result in behavioral inequalities and status hierarchies (see Figure 2 for a model of the theory in its simplest form). Although status characteristics and the meanings they evoke are culturally defined, they are consequential in terms of influence,

power, and prestige. Some status characteristics in American society include race, gender, education, and task expertise (Cohen & Roper 1972, Ridgeway 1997, Rashotte & Webster 2005).

Figure 2. Status Characteristics Theory: Simple Theoretical Model[1]

There are two types of status characteristics: 1) specific status characteristics and 2) diffuse status characteristics. Specific status characteristics carry performance expectations based on their direct relevance to the task – statistical knowledge in a group assigned to analyze a survey, for instance. Diffuse status characteristics carry general expectations of competence across a range of settings, in addition to specific expectations for particular tasks (Berger et al. 1980, Webster & Hysom 1998). Gender, race, and education are all examples of diffuse characteristics as the cultural beliefs associated with each reinforce ideas that the high states (male, white, and educated) of each indicate higher competence generally. For instance, cultural beliefs about gender hold that men

[1] This schematic comes from Correll and Ridgeway's (2003:31) overview chapter of the expectation states tradition and its theoretical framework.

are diffusely more competent than women (Correll & Ridgeway 2003). In contrast to in-group favoritism (Tajfel 1978) and beliefs held only by certain sub-sets of individuals, status beliefs such as these are consensual meanings that even those disadvantaged by the belief accept as a social fact (Correll & Ridgeway 2003).

Five core assumptions of SCT connect expectations to outcomes (Berger et al. 1977, Balkwell 1991; see Correll & Ridgeway 2003 for a more thorough overview). I discuss two assumptions relevant to the interplay between status characteristics and stigmas considered in this project. The first is the *salience assumption.* Status characteristics are not always activated. To influence performance expectations, they must become salient, either by differentiating actors in a socially significant way or by becoming relevant to the task at hand. Race is a characteristic that is most often activated, as it is an immediately visible attribute. It follows that stigmas, although different from status characteristics, would have to become salient (i.e. visible or noticed) to affect behavior.

The next assumption relevant to this project is the *aggregation assumption*, which explains how status beliefs associated with multiple characteristics are combined to form aggregate expectations. In most interactions, individuals differ from each other on multiple salient status characteristics at once. The aggregation assumption explains how actors combine multiple and sometimes inconsistent pieces of status information, usually unconsciously, to construct overarching expectations for performance. Two principles explain how status information is aggregated. According to the *attenuation effect*, each additional piece of consistent status information is subject to declining marginal impact. For example, learning that a Harvard trained lawyer is also white and male will have only

slight positive impact in the construction of high performance expectations (Correll & Ridgeway 2003). The *inconsistency effect*, by contrast, assumes that a single inconsistent piece of status information in a field of either all positive or all negative characteristics will be accorded more weight in the aggregation of expectations. For a white educated male, for instance, a devalued status characteristic such as being lower class would be relatively more disadvantageous because the characteristic is inconsistent with the high states of race and education.

If the combination of status characteristics and stigmatized characteristics were to follow these status order processes, they would support the following predictions:

1. A stigma will be *more* of a disadvantage for individuals with valued status characteristics.
2. A stigma will be *less* of a disadvantage for individuals with devalued status characteristics.

Substantive research on individuals who are both status-disadvantaged and stigmatized shows the opposite relation, however. In these studies devalued status characteristics paired with stigmas seem to intensify negative expectations. But what is behind this intensification? To answer this, it is necessary to fully conceptualize the unique properties of social stigmas along with the nature and strength of the moral beliefs associated with them.

Stigma

Erving Goffman's (1963) *Stigma* inspired a wealth of research on the consequences of stigmatizing attributes across the social sciences (Link & Phelan 2001). Since then, various different stigmas – from criminal record (Pager 2007), to mental illness (Wirth & Bodenhausen 2009, Link et al. 2004), to being on welfare (Gilens 1999) – have been firmly established as causes of disadvantage and widespread inequality. Like SCT, the literature on stigma links these attributes to behavior through shared beliefs, which are culturally defined. The beliefs that define stigmas are deeply discrediting, differentiating individuals as less desirable or as "quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak" (Goffman 1963:3; see also Becker 1963). Although some of the specific beliefs vary, stigmas also induce diffuse expectations of low competence (Goffman 1963, Lucas & Phelan 2012). And, like status characteristics, the cultural beliefs they carry are widely shared, even by the groups they disadvantage.

Broadly, there are two types of stigmatizing attributes: discredited stigmas and discreditable stigmas (Goffman 1963). Discredited stigmas are those that are immediately evident such as bodily abnormalities or visible handicaps. Discreditable stigmas require the disclosure of pertinent information to become salient. Criminal history and mental illness are both discreditable stigmas. However, they may become salient across a range of settings, either through mandated disclosure or associated behaviors.

Within these two types, there are three more specific categories of stigma (Goffman 1963): 1) tribal stigma (nationality, religion), 2) abominations of the body (physical disabilities, disfigurements), and 3) individual blemishes of character (criminal

history, mental illness, addiction, homelessness).[2] This project focuses on the third type, stigmas that are perceived as "blemishes" of moral character, or those associated with a set of moral auxiliary characteristics such as dishonesty, weak will, irresponsibility, and rigid beliefs (Goffman 1963, Becker 1963; Corrigan 2000, Link and Phelan 2001). Stigmas within this category are often perceived as moral transgressions for which the individual is blamed or thought to be at fault (Link & Phelan 2001, Corrigan 2000, Gibbons 1986, Goffman 1963, Becker 1963). Given the moral threat these stigmatized characteristics represent, individuals are often met by the non-stigmatized or "normals" (Goffman 1963) with strong negative emotional responses (Link et al. 2004), blame (Gilens 1999, Corrigan 2000), beliefs that the person is deeply flawed (Gibbons 1986), and an effort to maintain social distance (Lucas and Phelan 2012; Phelan et al. 2014). These responses differ in nature and intensity from the status beliefs that inform performance expectations associated with devalued status characteristics in the absence of stigma.

Link and Phelan (2001) combine these classic insights on stigma, and the more fragmented research on specific stigmas, to create a more systematic set of processes linking stigmatization to outcomes. They outline the following four processes of stigmatization:

1. People distinguish and label human differences.

[2] The distinctions that Goffman draws among these types of stigmas are subject to dispute, and are blurred in contemporary research. I use the typology to bound stigmas that have to do with the moral character of individuals, and for which individuals are frequently blamed. For these types of stigmas, Goffman's third category offers a useful framework with which to fully conceptualize them.

2. Dominant cultural beliefs link labeled persons to undesirable characteristics.
3. Labeled persons are placed into categories to accomplish separation of 'us' from 'them.'
4. Labeled persons experience status loss, discrimination, rejection, and exclusion, which leads to negative outcomes such as demoralization, restricted social networks, reduced earnings.

Each of the processes of stigmatization listed here bears resemblance to core tenets of SCT. And further work identifies several common features of status and stigma (Lucas and Phelan 2012, Phelan et al. 2014). There are, however, important differences that have not yet been examined. Next, I discuss these differences and why stigmatized and status characteristics should be treated and tested as distinct concepts.

Differentiating Status and Stigma

It is tempting to think of stigmas as similar to or the same as devalued states of status characteristics. Indeed, they share some core properties: they are both negatively differentiating characteristics, they both evoke diffuse, negative expectations, and they both operate as sources of disadvantage due to these expectations. It is because of these types of similarities that both Driskell (1982) and Berger and colleagues (1992) argue that status organizing processes are not limited only to status characteristics: that other types of personal characteristics, including *moral* characteristics like social stigmas, "may be processed in much the same way as status characteristics" (Berger et al. 1992). Indeed, Wagner (1993) calls for the stigma of mental illness to be incorporated into SCT, having

the necessary properties to operate as a diffuse status characteristic. In addition, Lucas and Phelan's (2012) recent bridging piece suggests that status characteristics and stigmatized characteristics converge in two more of their specific processes. First, individuals with certain stigmatized attributes have less influence in task groups. Secondly, specific status characteristics (i.e. task expertise) mitigate the negative impact of some social stigmas, as they do in combination with devalued status characteristics.

Despite passing references to the idea that moral attributes like stigmatized characteristics might operate according to status processes, and evidence of some overlap between the characteristics from Lucas and Phelan's (2012) study, the idea that the two types of characteristics work in the same way demands more serious consideration. In this study, I argue that although status characteristics and stigmas share several properties, there are four important differences that suggest that the two types of characteristics are different and should be treated as analytically distinct.

The first difference is that stigmas do not meet all three criteria of diffuse status characteristics (Berger et al. 1977), which must have: 1) differentially evaluated states, 2) similarly evaluated specific status characteristics associated with each state, and 3) a similarly evaluated general expectation state associated with each state. Stigmas differ mostly on the basis of the first and third criteria. In contrast to characteristics like race and gender, which have two or more clearly evaluated states – for instance, two states of the status characteristic of race include white (valued) and black (devalued)[3], and two states of the status characteristic of gender include male (valued) and female (devalued) –

[3] The status characteristic of race has more than two evaluated states, as is recognized within status characteristics theory. I use only two status states here (Black and white) because these are the levels of race used throughout this study.

stigmas have only one clear state infused with devalued cultural beliefs. Although the stigmatized are contrasted with "normals," the absence of the characteristic is not necessarily an evaluated state. More likely, it is something that is passed over, assumed, or not recognized in interaction.

The second difference has to do with the ways that status differences and social stigmas are perceived, particularly with respect to normality. Phelan and colleagues (2014) argue that status characteristics have states that are either socially valued or devalued. Although the devalued status state is associated with low performance expectations, it is usually still regarded as "normal" or standard. That is, those who occupy a devalued status state, such as women, are usually still regarded as normal in terms of human functionality, appearance, and regard for social norms. However, stigmatized characteristics, they argue, imply a difference that is non-standard, abnormal, and/or deviant. As a characteristic perceived as abnormal or deviant, it is likely to prompt sharper distinctions "drawn between the people 'we' are and the kind of people a stigmatized 'they' are" (Phelan et al. 2014:18).

Further, Phelan and colleagues (2014) argue that stigmas – due to their perceived abnormality – disrupt social ordering and interactional norms typically associated with status differences within interactions. Correll (2006) states that status-based interactions are governed by "social ordering schema" that guide and smooth interactions between different status groups. Phelan and colleagues (2014) explain social ordering schema with reference to the status characteristic of gender:

> The shared status beliefs that associate status and competence differences with people who differ on given social characteristics effectively provide people from

> different status groups with a common knowledge schema for anticipating one another's behavior and coordinating their interaction accordingly. For example, there is a culturally shared belief that men are more esteemed and competent than women… these shared status beliefs tell people how they should behave in interactions with one another (men more assertively; women more deferentially); and people act out their roles accordingly (Phelan et al. 2014:19).

Although there are shared beliefs that stigmatized individuals are less competent – or even as Goffman (1963) asserts, less "human" – than "normals" (Goffman 1963, Link et al. 1989, Link & Phelan 2001), interactions between stigmatized persons and "normals" lack the same common knowledge schema. This is because stigmatized attributes cause ambiguity of norms and expectations, i.e. people may not know what to expect or how to interact with the stigmatized person (Phelan et al. 2014). The moral nature of stigma makes these ambiguous expectations especially problematic; in addition to unsettled reactions to people with a stigmatized characteristic involving fear or anxiety (Goffman 1963, Phelan et al 2014), social responses may also be affected by uncertainty regarding qualities of moral character: perceptions of honesty, responsibility, trustworthiness, and so on. These divergences between status characteristics and social stigmas suggest that the characteristics should be conceptualized differently, likely having unique properties in the ways they produce and reinforce inequalities.

Most importantly, though, stigmas do not seem to follow the aggregation assumption of SCT. Specifically, research that examines cases where stigmas combine with devalued status characteristics (Pager 2007, Wirth & Bodenhausen 2009) shows that when negative status states combine with a stigmatized attribute, there is an

intensification of disadvantage. In Pager's (2007) study, had the stigma of criminal history and the devalued status of race operated according to the aggregation assumption of SCT, it would have supported the following predictions:

1. The criminal credential will be *more* of a disadvantage for white males given the inconsistency effect.
2. The criminal credential will be *less* of a disadvantage for black males given the attenuation effect.

Pager, however, finds the opposite: there is magnified disadvantage when the stigma of a criminal record combines with the devalued state of race. This magnification of disadvantage is puzzling when considering the status aggregation assumption and criminological work like that of Petit and Lyons (2007) who make the same prediction about the relationship between race, crime, and disadvantage as would SCT: that a criminal record would be relatively more of a disadvantage for white individuals with a criminal record than for black criminal offenders. These predictions are firmly in conflict with the intensification effect that Pager found among black job seekers with a criminal record. This status-stigma intensification effect has also been observed with respect to other combinations of status characteristics and stigmatized attributes, like gender and mental illness. For instance, Wirth and Bodenhausen (2009) find a similar amplification in the negative judgments based on certain mental illnesses when paired with being female.

The moral nature of stigma is a potential reason for this inconsistency. While stigmas do evoke generally low performance expectations – which likely combine with and magnify the low performance expectations associated with status, contributing to some of the intensification – these expectations cannot be separated from the intense moral expectations that also emerge. The belief that stigmatized attributes are a sign of a moral transgression, for which the individual is at fault, invokes strong negative responses including fear, distancing, and blame. These responses are different – likely much stronger in intensity – from the responses invoked by low performance expectations associated with status characteristics in the absence of stigma.

It may not only be the strength of the moral expectations associated with stigma causing the intensification, however. There is a large body of evidence that suggests that status characteristics too have moral dimensions (Smith-Rosenberg 1972, Lamont 2000, Payne 2001, Payne et al. 2002, Eberhardt et al. 2004, Hadjor 2005, Herek 1997), which could explain the intensification in negative expectations and judgments when paired with stigmas. This is not to say that status characteristics are stigmas. The moral dimension of status does not always come into play, but could certainly be activated. In the next section, I propose to relate status and stigma by bringing in morality. Specifically, I argue that devalued states of status characteristics have underlying moral dimensions that can be activated by the presence of a stigmatized characteristic. This proposition has important implications for bringing the status and stigma literature together. If supported, it means not only that stigmas do not follow status order processes, but also that there are properties of status yet to be examined in SCT, which may become salient when paired with non-status characteristics.

CHAPTER 3: BRINGING IN MORALITY

In this chapter, I identify moral expectations as a new theoretical mechanism that explains the divergence between status organizing processes and processes of stigmatization. While the types of stigmatized characteristics I discuss in this study are generally identified as highly moralized characteristics (Goffman 1963, Corrigan 2000), moral dimensions of status characteristics are not considered or investigated within the status literature. Here, I propose that stigmatized characteristics – given that they invoke strong beliefs and judgments about moral character – may interlock with and activate underlying moral dimensions of status characteristics. In the final section of this chapter, I suggest that this activation of underlying moral expectations associated with status will operate to intensify disadvantage for individuals who are both status-disadvantaged and stigmatized.

Morality of Status

The stigma literature makes clear the moral nature of stigmatized characteristics. By contrast, moral qualities of status characteristics are largely absent in the literature on status characteristics[4]. There are, however, implicit assumptions about the moral beliefs that certain status characteristics invoke. In Lucas and Phelan's (2012) bridging study, they choose to test only "pure" status characteristics and stigmas in their examination of

[4] Exceptions to this include Driskell's (1982) and Berger and colleagues' (1992) studies that mention the possibility of different sorts of expectations, including possible moral expectations. However, this idea was not investigated further nor empirically tested within the expectation states tradition.

the interrelation of status and stigmatization processes. They test educational attainment as a status characteristic, but exclude status characteristics like race because they appear to "straddle" the status-stigma distinction, representing both types of characteristics.

This project deals precisely with these "in between" characteristics. However, they are not conceptualized in the same way, as "straddling" the domain between status and stigmatized characteristics. Rather, following the discussion in the previous section, I treat status and stigma as analytically distinct concepts and separate types of individual characteristics. In some cases, though, they seem to converge by way of a similar moral dimension that so far has not been recognized as a component of status characteristics within SCT or the EST framework. Certain status characteristics are also infused with moral expectations (along with performance expectations) that might induce comparable judgments and similar types of social distancing as stigmas. As Lucas and Phelan (2012) point out, race is one of these. Gender and social class are other examples of status characteristics associated with strong moral beliefs and expectations – although they may not always be activated.

However, it is likely that the moral dimension of status would be activated by a stigmatized characteristic. Lamont's (2000) work on the symbolic boundaries (the criteria individuals use to distinguish *us* from *them*) mobilized against marginalized racial and class groups highlights the moral dimensions of certain status characteristics and sheds light on why associated disadvantage might be exacerbated by a social stigma. The consequential nature of moral boundaries associated with common status characteristics is perhaps best observed in the workplace. Lamont finds that white workers frequently drew boundaries against black workers on the basis of morality and character. White

workers expected blacks to violate moral norms of integrity, to be lazy and rely on welfare, and to be irresponsible in workplace situations. Generally, black workers were believed to "threaten what is good about America" (Lamont 2000:61) – that is, a strong moral compass and work ethic. The connection between morality and work ethic demonstrates an intermingling of moral and performance expectations. Moral beliefs often informed perceptions of poor work ethic and performance. White workers used moral beliefs as grounds for evaluating black workers as less intelligent, skilled, competent, and worthy of advancement (Lamont 2000; see also Moss & Tilly 2001, Pager & Karafin 2009).

Many of the white workers in the study also associated black workers with immoral behavior, including criminal behavior. Even without a documented record, criminal history was an auxiliary characteristic already linked with race. This is indicative of a "moral view" (Pager 2007, Garland 2001) of crime – that "crime act[s] as a lens through which to view the poor – as undeserving, deviant, dangerous, different" (Garland 2001:102). Lamont (2000) shows that it has also become a lens through which to view the racially marginalized. The connection between being black and perceived criminality is corroborated by experimental studies in sociology and psychology that show a strong, bi-directional cognitive association between race and crime (Eberhardt et al. 2004, Steen et al. 2006). Further, studies using both interview data (Lamont 2000) and survey data (Pager 2013) suggest that individuals readily associate blackness – and particularly black men – with violent, dangerous, and immoral behavior.

There is also evidence that other status characteristics like gender are associated with blemishes of character, even in the absence of a stigma. There is a large body of

work that demonstrates the long history of uneven character and personality judgements leveled at women that operate to reinforce gender inequality. The moral character bind for women is based in part on how gender norms structure expectations and assumptions for women's behavior and interactions (Goffman 1959, 1961b; Hochschild 1979; Schur 1984). In discussing the ways women are constructed as inferior or deviant by virtue of their femininity, Schur (1984) notes the role of character – emotional character in particular – and the thin line women must walk with respect to their presentation of self:

> [Women] are believed to be "innately" emotional, and are expected to act accordingly—up to a point. Yet women's actions are regularly dismissed as being the results of their "emotionalism," and the deviance label "hysterical woman" is frequently applied. Even when this extreme is not reached, women often are perceived as displaying the "wrong" emotions. (Schur 1984:55).

Just as beliefs about moral character associated with race and criminal history help to co-construct the connection between blackness and criminality, femininity and mental illness too can interlock and operate in a mutually constitutive manner.

Indeed, in Smith-Rosenberg's (1972) "The Hysterical Woman," she traces the sociocultural history of hysteria (a state of neurosis or character disorder) and how it interlocks with qualities of women and femininity. Some of the historical instances of female "hysteria" were surely a result of actual mental illnesses yet to be diagnosed. However, as Smith-Rosenberg asserts, not all of these women were "hysterics." The dominant explanation is that hysteria was used "as a dramatic medical metaphor for everything that men found mysterious or unmanageable about women" (Devereux 19:2014). Although much has changed since Smith-Rosenberg's article, women are still

frequently perceived as "crazy" or "unreasonable" for behavior that would be accepted if exhibited by men (Chrisler & Levy 2008). More generally, femininity is associated with being helpless, out of control, overly emotional, submissive, and infantile (Goffman 1976, Browne 1998).

The Activation of Moral Expectations

Low moral expectations are not salient at all times for individuals with devalued statuses. However, it is likely that they would be activated by a stigma. Combining a criminal record with being black is like providing evidence that negative moral beliefs *and* low performance expectations associated with particular racial characteristics are accurate. In the same way, a mental illness combined with being female might reinforce some of the dysfunctional character traits and perceptions of low competence already bound up with gender. In both cases, the stigma may serve to legitimize moral expectations and performance expectations associated with status characteristics, making it more likely that the individual will be blamed for their condition (Hadjor 2005). Thus I make the initial assumption that social stigmas call out and reinforce low moral expectations associated with devalued states of status characteristics – expectations that have remained dormant in SCT research to date. These moral expectations contribute to intensified disadvantage directly, and also, given their association with perceived competence (Goffman 1963, Sibicky and Dovidio 1986, Lamont 2000, Pager and Karafin 2009), indirectly through their negative influence on performance expectations.

Hypotheses

From the previous literature, I derive a set of hypotheses predicting a general status-stigma interaction mediated by moral and performance expectations. Specifically, this study tests three new general hypotheses, each with two sub-hypotheses specific to the two status-stigma pairings:

H1: Status and stigma will interact in their effects on workplace outcomes, with the negative effects of a devalued status state intensified when combined with a stigmatized characteristic.

H1a: The negative effects of being black (versus white) on workplace outcomes will be intensified when combined with the stigma of criminal history.

H1b: The negative effects of being female (versus male) on workplace outcomes will be intensified when combined with the stigma of mental illness.

H2: Moral expectations will significantly mediate the interaction between status characteristics and stigma in their effect on workplace evaluations.

H2a: Moral expectations will significantly mediate the interaction between race and criminal history.

H2b: Moral expectations will significantly mediate the interaction between gender and mental illness.

H3: Performance expectations will also operate to mediate the interaction between status characteristics and stigma in their effect on workplace evaluations.

H3a: Performance expectations will significantly mediate the interaction between race and criminal history.

H3b: Performance expectations will significantly mediate the interaction between gender and mental illness.

These hypotheses are modeled in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3. Theoretical Model of the Mediated Status-Stigma Interaction and its Effect on Workplace Outcomes



CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

In this chapter, I discuss the experimental approach used to examine the theoretical process through which the combined effects of status and stigma produce intensified disadvantage. I provide a brief justification of the characteristics I have chosen to test and the context for the experimental scenario used to examine their effects. I then explain the logic of experimentation within sociology followed by a specific overview of the experimental design, procedures participants, and manipulations as well as the multi-stage analytic approach used to analyze the results. Finally, I present descriptive statistics from each of the two experiments.

I test hypotheses regarding the status-stigma intensification effect and the mediating effect of moral expectations, along with performance expectations, in two controlled, laboratory experiments. To move toward a general theory of status and stigma intensification, I test two sets of devalued status characteristics and stigmatized characteristics. Although no single attribute can act as a prototype of either characteristic, I have selected characteristics commonly studied in each framework. As race and gender are two characteristics firmly incorporated into SCT as status characteristics and both have large bodies of literature examining their associated cultural beliefs, I use these characteristics to investigate the status-stigma intensification effect and the role of moral expectations. Criminal history and mental illness are also two of the most commonly studied stigmatized attributes, each equipped with an abundance of research on associated disadvantage and negative cultural beliefs.

I examine my predictions about the status-stigma pairings in two experiments using an experimental hiring scenario. I use the case of the workplace as it is a highly consequential social sphere where both status and stigma are likely to become salient. Within this experimental situation, participants were tasked with evaluating fictitious, but ostensibly real job applicants with varying combinations of the status-stigma pairings on several important workplace outcomes. The employment setting is based on the procedures laid out in Correll and colleagues' (2007) path-breaking study establishing motherhood as a status characteristic. In their study, participants evaluate equally qualified mock job applicants who vary on gender and parenthood status. This framework is useful for the present study as both status characteristics and stigmatized characteristics are highly consequential in the labor market (Correll et al. 2007, Link & Phelan 2001). Indeed, much of the research concerning race, gender, criminal history, and mental illness focuses on how the characteristics are implicated in workplace outcomes (Pager 2007, Lamont 2000, Pager & Karafin 2009, Ettner et al. 1997, Holzer 1996, Moss & Tilly 2001). Further, the main dependent variable of "intensified disadvantage" can be clearly operationalized along a series of job-related rankings or evaluations. Following Correll and colleagues' (2007) study I use evaluations of hireability, promotability, and recommended starting salary.

The Experimental Method

I use experimental methods to test the predicted status-stigma interaction and the mediating role of moral and performance expectations. Laboratory experiments are optimal for recreating theoretically relevant aspects of situations and, within them,

isolating variables of interest to determine causal relationships. The controlled setting eliminates confounding variables that make causal inference difficult in natural settings. Here, the experimental setting allows for the creation of a situation where individuals (in this case paid undergraduate participants) evaluate potential job candidates on outcomes related to workplace success. It also allows for the manipulation of status and stigmatized characteristics across mock job-applicants while keeping all other characteristics (qualifications, work experience, education, etc.) constant. This is important to insure that differences in participant evaluations can be attributed solely to various status-stigma combinations.

Experiments are ideal for isolating causal processes, yet there are several common criticisms leveled at the method that must be addressed – particularly in a study that deals with particular characteristics of individuals and a mock employment scenario. The first, perhaps most prominent criticism of experiments, is based on their artificiality: experimental settings do not resemble real-world situations, which prohibit generalization of results to populations. It is true that experiments do not mirror naturally occurring events. However, what gets lost when scholars level this criticism at the method is that they do not aim to recreate natural settings. The goal of most true experiments is to construct formal, causal theories by testing relationships among abstract theoretical variables. To accomplish this goal, the artificiality of experimental situations is actually an asset (Zelditch 1969, Martin and Sell 1979). The artificial setting allows the researcher to infer causation precisely because it eliminates confounding or spurious variables that make assessing causal relationships difficult in the natural settings. Further, most experimentalists do not attempt to generalize results directly to real world populations.

Instead, findings are generalized to theory by testing, replicating, and extending theoretical processes or relationships. Once established, these theories – which usually represent the culmination of multiple experiments – can then be applied to and assessed in real world contexts. Application to natural phenomena as well as pairing experiments with other methods can help to strengthen the external validity of theories constructed in the laboratory.

Overview of Experimental Design

I investigate the status-stigma interaction effect and the mediating role of moral and performance expectations in two experiments that correspond to two different cases: race/criminal history and gender/mental illness. Each experiment consists of two factors (status and stigma) in a mixed design. This means that, in each experiment, a status characteristic is varied between subjects, creating two experimental conditions (the valued status state or the devalued status state), and the presence or absence of a stigma is varied within each of these conditions (i.e., within subjects). In the first experiment, race (black or white) is the status characteristic, and criminal record is the stigmatized characteristic. In the second experiment, gender (female or male) is the status characteristic, and mental illness is the stigmatized characteristic. The nature of this design is such that, within each experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to two of the four conditions. That is, participants were randomly assigned to review two mock applicants who exhibited the same level of the status characteristic (both mock applicants either having the valued status state *or* the devalued status state) where one had a stigma and one did not.

Here, I describe the mixed design as it applies to each experiment in particular. For the race/criminal history experiment, the nature of the mixed design means that subjects were randomly assigned two of the four experimental conditions: each subject *either* reviewed two white applicants (as race varies between subjects) where one had a criminal record and one did not (as the stigma of criminal record varies within subjects), *or* two black applicants where one had a criminal record and one did not. In the gender/mental illness experiment, the mixed design follows the same logic: subjects reviewed *either* two male applicants (as gender varies between subjects) where one had a mental illness and one did not (as mental illness varies within subjects), *or* two female applicants where one had a mental illness and one did not.

The first experiment holds constant the gender of the job applicants (all were males), and the second experiment holds constant the race of the job applicants (all were white). These characteristics are held constant so that each experiment only tests the effect of *one* devalued status characteristic state (being black in the first experiment, being female in the second) in conjunction with a stigma (having a criminal record in the first experiment, having a mental illness in the second). In both experiments, each participant was presented with a pair of applicants to evaluate, with both applicants having the same state of the status characteristic (both black or both white in Experiment 1, and both female or both male in Experiment 2), but varying on the presence or absence of the stigma (one with a criminal history and one without, or one with a history of mental illness and one without). The order in which participants reviewed the two files (with or without the stigmatized characteristic) was counterbalanced within conditions.

Table 4.1. Mixed Experimental Design and Cell Composition of Experiment 1: Race and Criminal History

	Between Subjects Factor **Status (Race)**			
	White (40 Participants)		Black (40 Participants)	
Within Subjects Factor **Stigma (Criminal History)**	*No Criminal Record*	*Criminal Record*	*No Criminal Record*	*Criminal Record*

Table 4.2. Mixed Experimental Design and Cell Composition of Experiment 2: Gender and Mental Illness

	Between Subjects Factor **Status (Gender)**			
	Male (40 Participants)		Female (40 Participants)	
Within Subjects Factor **Stigma (Mental Illness)**	*No Mental Illness*	*Mental Illness*	*No Mental Illness*	*Mental Illness*

The mixed design for each experiment – including the various levels of the status and stigma variables and the number of participants assigned to each condition – is represented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. As also shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, each of the four experimental conditions was tested using 40 participants. To allow for examination of possible gender differences among participants, each status condition was first blocked by participant gender (with 20 female and 20 male participants per condition), with female and male participants randomly assigned to one of the experimental status conditions. It is possible that gender differences could influence the results given evidence that men and women respond slightly differently to status characteristics – men having been observed to be more sensitive than women to status and status beliefs in their evaluations of others[5]. This arrangement requires a total of 160 participants across the two experiments (80 participants in Experiment 1 and 80 participants in Experiment 2).

Participants

Undergraduate students who were legal adults and had work experience were recruited from a large, Southwestern university as participants for the experiments. Specifically, I recruited undergraduates via email using a master list of 30,000 student email addresses, which comprised close to the full student population at the university. The participants included 80 undergraduate women and 80 undergraduate men. Although the use of undergraduate subjects in experiments is subject to criticisms regarding

[5] Although each condition was blocked on participant gender, this participant characteristic did not significantly affect the mediating variables or the workplace outcome measures in either experiment so it is not included as a factor in the following analyses.

whether or not student responses reflect those of the wider population, they are appropriate participants in this project for several reasons. First, testing how status and stigma interact to produce discrimination and bias requires that participants examine the applications in detail and make evaluations carefully, a process that takes an hour or more. It would not be feasible to recruit close to 200 employers to visit the lab to participate in this sort of exercise. However, the theories involved in this study do not make any assumptions about the particular individuals doing the evaluating. The cultural beliefs and expectations associated with status and stigmatized characteristics are shared in the broader culture, not just among employers. Thus undergraduate students should not make significantly different evaluations than employers given the same information. Indeed, research such as Correll and colleagues' (2007) study, which paired an audit study of actual employers and a laboratory study of undergraduate evaluators to examine bias related to gender and parenthood in employment, shows that employers and undergraduate evaluators make similar evaluations of job applicants (see also Cleveland 1991, Benard and Correll 2010). Further, undergraduates are often thought to be more tolerant or progressive on social issues such as those presented in this paper. This argument suggests that the use of undergraduate students as participants may constitute a more conservative test of the theory.

Procedures and Cover Story

In the experiments, undergraduate participants evaluated two (mock, but ostensibly real) applicants and made suggestions regarding hiring and other workplace outcomes for what they believed was a real organization. Aside from a brief greeting and

explanation of how the participants would complete the experiment, the instructions and applicant materials were all relayed via an online form to minimize the influence of the researcher. After securing informed consent, participants read a series of instructions that explained the fictitious company: Gravian Inc., an information services company based in Tempe, Arizona[6]. The instructions also explained that the organization was conducting an employment search to fill an open Information Services Specialist position. This particular type of organization and position was chosen due to its relative neutrality and abstractness. I was conscious to select an organization and occupational position that would not by default skew toward the exclusion of women, black applicants, criminal offenders, or individuals with mental illnesses. For instance, I excluded governmental organizations, positions involving work with children, and positions that involved directly handling money. These occupations and positions were excluded because they might have specifically disadvantaged criminal offenders. Similarly, gendered fields and positions, like care-work or manual labor occupations, were also excluded. In addition, I selected a position that did not require a post-secondary education or degree so that it would not seem out of reach given common cultural beliefs about individuals who are status-disadvantaged and stigmatized and their possible occupational trajectories.

Participants were then informed that as part of the organization's mission to cultivate a strong community-oriented culture and remain responsive to community needs, the organization is seeking input from various community members, particularly

[6] As the cover story was relayed via a university laboratory computer, I was able to restrict participants' ability to navigate away from the experimental materials. Using computer controls, I ensured that participants could not use any web search engines to attempt to research the fictitious company and be made aware of the deception involved in the study.

younger members to provide fresh and innovative ideas about hiring. Participants were then told that the company had collaborated with a team of University of Arizona researchers to solicit this input and would incorporate participant feedback into their hiring decisions. In addition to payment of $20 for their participation, subjects were informed of a $45 bonus if the company hired the candidate that they recommended. This "bonus" was used as an incentive for participants to pay close attention to the applicants and to take the task seriously. Participants still had a chance to receive the bonus of $45; however, it was the result of a drawing at the end of the study rather than the "hire." Participants were notified of the drawing in the debriefing after the experiment.

I model these procedures, including the use of deception, on work by Correll and colleagues (2007). Following their study of the motherhood penalty in the workplace, participants received two files of application materials for two mock applicants. They were told that the study was in its final stages, which was why they were only evaluating two of the finalists from the applicant pool. Each file included résumés and mock interviewer notes taken by a fictitious human resources agent who had ostensibly interviewed the candidates. Résumés and interviewer notes were used to establish that the two candidates are equally qualified and had equivalent skills and backgrounds. These applicant materials were also used to manipulate status (via race and gender-associated names) and stigmatized characteristics (via comments in the interviewer notes). The order in which the participants reviewed the mock applicants (whether the applicant with the stigmatized characteristic came first or second) was counterbalanced within each of the conditions to reduce possible order effects.

Participants ranked the job applicants on their moral character and competence in what they were told was an "initial impressions survey" immediately after reviewing each set of application materials. After they had reviewed both of the files for the job applicants, they made evaluations of the applicants' hireability, promotability, and starting salary. The manipulations and the mediating and dependent measures are discussed in more detail below.

Manipulations

Status Manipulations

Race. Following several prominent experimental studies that manipulate similar individual characteristics (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, Correll et al. 2007), race and gender were manipulated through race- and gender-associated applicant names. In the race and criminal history experiment, race was manipulated by giving applicants distinctly "black" or distinctly "white" names. Jamal Washington and Tyrone Jefferson were used as black names and Matthew Christiansen and Brad Meyer as white names. These are the same names assigned to the black and white male applicants in Correll and colleagues' study on the motherhood penalty. These names also correspond with Levitt and Dubner's (2009) lists of race-associated names and Gaddis' (2017) recent study of race-associated names, which are broken down by gender.

Gender. To manipulate gender in the gender/mental illness experiment, the mock job applicants received gender-associated names – names commonly associated with either women or men. The first names of the applicants are the same as those used in Correll's (2007) experimental study. The mock applicants were also given first and last

names commonly associated with being white as race is held constant in the experiment. Participants race does not vary within or between conditions to assure that the results only reflect gender differences. The last names were also selected from Gaddis' (2017) recent work on race-associated names broken down by gender. The names for the female applicants were Sarah Becker and Alison Meyer, while the names of the male applicants were Matthew Becker and Brad Meyer.

Stigma Manipulations

Criminal History. The stigma of criminal history was manipulated using the mock, but ostensibly real interview notes. Along with a resume, each participant received a set of interview notes that they were told had been taken by a trained interviewer in an initial round of candidate interviews. At the end of the interviewer notes for the applicant with the stigma, there appeared an aside that states: "It came up in the interview that [applicant] has a criminal record, having recently served time in a prison facility." The details of the criminal record and type of charge were left intentionally vague so that specific beliefs associated with particular crimes would not influence participants' responses. This was the only indication in the applicant packet of the criminal history (i.e. it was not reflected on any other materials in the application packet).

Mental Illness. The stigma of mental illness was also manipulated using mock interviewer notes. In the same fashion, participants received a set of interviewer notes listing additional details about the candidate. In these notes, there was a comment that read: "It came up in the interview that [applicant] has recently spent time in a residential mental health rehabilitation facility for a mental illness." The type of mental illness was

intentionally left ambiguous given that particular mental health issues invoke particular meanings and expectations for behavior.

Measures of Mediating and Dependent Variables

Mediating Variables

Moral Expectations. This study introduces moral expectations, or perceived morality or character of the applicant, as a new intervening variable. Perceived morality is measured using 8 items designed to tap perceived morality. The items were part of a composite variable calculated as a summed average of participant ratings of applicants using a 9-point, bipolar scale (i.e. from "extremely honest" to "extremely dishonest"). The items were chosen from those most frequently discussed as root beliefs associated with stigmatized attributes in general (Goffman 1963, Becker 1963, Corrigan 2000, Link & Phelan 2001) and characteristics commonly used as bases for drawing moral boundaries against marginalized groups or "outsiders" (Lamont 1992, 2000; Pager 2013). Additionally, several items were taken from established scales[7] used in moral psychology and sociology as general assessments of moral character[8]. Listed are the poles of each scale: honest/dishonest, flexible/rigid, strong willed/weak willed, reasonable/unreasonable, trustworthy/untrustworthy, responsible/irresponsible, hardworking/lazy, stable/volatile.

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[7] Items appear on the Honesty/Humility scale in the HEXACO, which refers to six personality dimensions, including honesty/humility, emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness (Lee and Ashton 2004), the Temperament and Character Inventory (Cloninger et al. 1994) and the Moral Foundation Questionnaire (Graham et al. 2011).

[8] Some of the items selected from the stigma and boundaries literature were also present on these scales.

Performance Expectations. Following Correll and colleagues (2007), performance expectations, or the perceived competence of the applicant, were measured using 6 items designed to tap perceived competence. The poles of each scale are as follows: capable/incapable, efficient/inefficient, skilled/unskilled, intelligent/unintelligent, independent/dependent, self-confident/self-doubting.[9]

To test the presence of mediating effects of both moral (*Hypothesis 2*) and performance (*Hypothesis 3*) expectations on the status-stigma interaction, I first created a moral character index and a competence index from the items designed to measure perceived morality and perceived competence mentioned previously. The indices were constructed based on mean values across each set of moral and performance items, which loaded on scales with acceptably high internal consistencies at or above α=.7 (Nunnally 1978). In Experiment 1 on race and criminal history, I include the summed indices for perceived morality (Moral Expectations, $\alpha = 0.80$) and competence (Performance Expectations, $\alpha = 0.83$) to assess the two as mediating variables. In Experiment 2 on gender and mental illness, I incorporate the indices for perceived morality (Moral Expectations, $\alpha = 0.79$) and perceived competence (Performance Expectations, $\alpha = 0.71$) in the same way.

Dependent Variables

Workplace Outcomes. Correll and colleagues' (2007) evaluation measures are also used in this study, but in slightly modified form. Participants were asked to make three overarching workplace evaluations of the mock job applicants. Participants were

[9] See Appendix A for full moral/performance questionnaire.

first asked to provide a recommendation for hire on a 9-point scale. The scale ranged from "strongly recommend for hire" to "strongly recommend against hire." The second measure pertains to the expected likelihood that, if hired, the applicant will receive a promotion. The 9-point scale ranges from "will certainly receive a promotion" to "will certainly not receive a promotion". The final outcome measure prompts participants to recommend the starting salary in dollars for each applicant within a range of $25,000-$55,000.

Analytic Strategy

To begin to examine general properties that shape how status characteristics and stigmas interact to produce bias and discrimination, I conduct a multi-stage analysis of each experiment to illustrate how the status characteristics operate in conjunction with a social stigma. If the two characteristics follow status order logic – particularly the attenuation and inconsistency tenets of status characteristics theory's aggregation assumption – having a stigma should be relatively *less* of a disadvantage for applicants that are status-disadvantaged in the hiring scenario. This is because a stigmatized characteristic is inconsistent with valued status states (being white in the Experiment 1, and being male in Experiment 2) and therefore accorded more weight in the construction of expectations. The synthetic theory that bridges the status and stigma literatures presented here, however, predicts the opposite: having a social stigma should be relatively *more* of a disadvantage for status-disadvantaged applicants (black applicants in Experiment 1, female applicants in Experiment 2) than for status advantaged applicants in the experimental hiring scenario (*Hypothesis 1*). Due to the moral nature of stigma,

low moral expectations associated with devalued status states will be activated and reinforced – intensifying disadvantage for applicants who are status-disadvantaged and stigmatized.

To test *Hypothesis 1* (and its sub hypotheses), which predicts a two-way interaction between status and stigma, I conducted a mixed-design analysis of variance (mixed ANOVA) of status and stigma on each of the three dependent variables (hireability, promotability, and salary) by status and stigma. The mixed ANOVA estimation procedure is used to test for differences between groups when one or more factors vary between subjects (status in this design, i.e. applicants' race or gender) and one or more factors vary within subjects (stigma in this design, i.e. criminal history or mental illness). If results confirm my hypotheses, the tests will show a significant interaction of status and stigma in each experiment that negatively influences workplace outcomes.

Before testing moral and performance expectations as mediating variables, I first examine the effect of the status-stigma interaction in each experiment on perceived moral character and perceived competence as dependent variables using a mixed-design analysis of variance procedure. This is a preliminary test that will allow me to assess whether the manipulated variables produce an interactive effect on moral and performance expectations. These analyses are necessary to determine whether the two sets of expectations can operate as mediating variables in the proceeding models.

To formally assess *Hypotheses 2* and *3* (and their sub-hypotheses), I then conduct a *conditional process analysis* (Hayes 2012, 2013) of the full moderated mediation model presented in Figure 3. Hayes defines this procedure as a regression-based approach to

examine the underlying mechanisms or processes through which one variable influences another. This approach enables examination of mediating effects of one or more variables while simultaneously allowing those effects to be contingent on other variables. In other words, the conditional process analysis allows for a test of moderation and mediation effects in a single model. It also allows for a formal test of the statistical significance of the indirect effects of mediating variables (moral and performance expectations) on the three workplace outcomes. To account for potential interdependence of observations (Hoechle 2007), I use robust standard errors in the analyses of each of the experiments.

Mediation Analyses: A Caveat

Before turning to the descriptive statistics and results for the two experiments, I would like to offer one caveat on the analytic approach taken here. There are several other studies that use similar experimental procedures to those described here to produce similar kinds of data on how certain variables mediate the effects of others with a theoretical process or relationship (Correll et al. 2007, Benard and Correll 2010). In these studies, a common approach for analyzing mediation has been to estimate a series of multivariate models where one includes key predictor variables and a second includes a mediating variable. In this approach, mediation is determined by whether the predictor variables in the first model are reduced with the inclusion of the mediating variable(s) in the proceeding model. Although this has been a common approach used in research similar to the present study, it has been subject to several recent critiques. Indeed, a recent editor's note in the *American Sociological Review* suggests a disciplinary shift

away from this analytic approach (Mustillo et al. 2018). The content of their critique of "Testing Mediation" is as follows:

> Authors usually proceed like this—they run one model with their key predictor plus controls and then a second model adding the mediator. If the coefficient of the key predictor is reduced or rendered nonsignificant, the authors conclude that the main effect has been mediated.
>
> There are several problems with this approach. Most commonly, authors fail to run a significance test for the difference in magnitude between coefficients. This step is necessary to determine whether mediation has occurred. The coefficient of the key predictor can be reduced or even rendered nonsignificant yet still be in the window of what could be considered to have occurred by chance alone.
>
> We recommend that authors who aim to test mediation in future *ASR* publications implement more sophisticated strategies as appropriate.

With this call from the flagship sociology journal for more sophisticated models that include significance tests to determine mediation, I depart from standards set in other experimental studies. Instead, I opt to use a *conditional process analysis* (Hayes 2012, 2013), which will allow for a formal analysis of the significance of the mediating variables I investigate in this study.

Descriptive Statistics

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below show the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables and mediating variables by each of the levels of the status and stigma variables in Experiment 1 and 2.

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 1: Means of Workplace Outcome Variables by Race and Criminal History

	White Applicant		**Black Applicant**	
	No Criminal History	*Criminal History*	*No Criminal History*	*Criminal History*
Mediating Variables				
Moral Expectations	7.59 (0.96)	7.15 (1.04)	7.52 (0.82)	5.94 (1.29)
Performance Expectations	7.84 (0.89)	7.46 (0.99)	7.66 (0.93)	7.12 (1.22)
Workplace Outcomes				
Hireability (Scale of 1-9; 1=low, 9=high)	8.3 (0.88)	7 (1.77)	7.88 (1.10)	5.4 (2.3)
Promotability (Scale of 1-9; 1=low, 9=high)	8.1 (1.01)	7.2 (1.76)	7.7 (1.33)	5.8 (2.1)
Salary (Range 25K-55K)	$41,875 ($7,936.24)	$34,650 ($6,070.31)	$39,000 ($6767.2)	$32,900 ($6,892.9)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 4.4. Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 2: Means of Workplace Outcome Variables by Gender and Mental Illness

	Male Applicant		**Female Applicant**	
	No Mental Illness	*Mental Illness*	*No Mental Illness*	*Mental Illness*
Mediating Variables				
Moral Expectations	7.74 (0.94)	7.25 (0.85)	7.43 (0.83)	6.31 (1.66)
Performance Expectations	7.7 (1.08)	5.16 (0.38)	7.55 (1.07)	5.38 (0.50)
Workplace Outcomes				
Hireability (Scale of 1-9; 1=low, 9=high)	7.69 (1.59)	7.31 (1.32)	8.00 (1.13)	6.05 (2.35)
Promotability (Scale of 1-9; 1=low, 9=high)	7.77 (1.24)	7.31 (0.99)	7.85 (1.00)	6.45 (2.16)
Salary (Range 25K-55K)	$39,522.86 ($7,505.34)	$37,102.86 ($5,739.13)	$37,887.50 ($7,263.79)	$35,125.00 ($7,315.03)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 – RACE AND CRIMINAL HISTORY

In previous chapters, I have hypothesized that there will be a significant status-stigma interaction, where a social stigma will intensify the negative cultural beliefs associated with the devalued state of a status characteristic (*Hypothesis 1*). This is a departure from previous work that suggests stigmatized characteristics are similar in some ways to status characteristics and will follow certain status order processes (Lucas and Phelan 2012). Further, I have argued that a social stigma will trigger strong expectations of low moral character, which will activate underlying moral dimensions of status and will drive the interaction effect. That is, I expect that moral expectations will mediate the moderating effect of the status-stigma interaction (*Hypothesis 2*). Finally, I expect that moral expectations will mediate this relationship along with performance expectations associated with status and, arguably, with stigma as well (*Hypothesis 3*). In this chapter, I turn to the results of Experiment 1, which uses the case of *race and criminal history,* to investigate whether the hypotheses regarding the status-stigma interaction and the mediating effects of moral and performance expectations are upheld or disconfirmed.

Specifically, in reference to Experiment 1, I have hypothesized that the stigma of criminal record will interact with the devalued state of the status characteristic of race (or being black), intensifying disadvantage across key workplace outcomes (hireability, promotability, and salary). This "intensification effect" (Pager 2007) of being black and having a criminal record has been demonstrated in several prominent studies of race,

criminal history, and the workplace discussed in previous sections. Thus, I expect that the applicant's race (specifically being black) will interact with criminal history to diminish work-related evaluations. Given the highly moral nature of a stigma like criminal history, I have also predicted that moral expectations, which research demonstrates are also infused with race, will be activated and will mediate the interaction. Finally, I also predict that a stigma like criminal history will also drive down performance expectations associated with the devalued status state of race. The specific theoretical model that I examine with respect to these particular status (race) and stigmatized (criminal history) characteristics is presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Theoretical Model of the Mediated Race-Criminal History Interaction and its Effect on Workplace Evaluations



The Race-Criminal History Interaction and its Effect on Workplace Outcomes

To examine the prediction laid out in *H1* and *H1a* regarding the two-way interaction between status and stigma, I present a mixed ANOVA of participants' mean workplace evaluation scores by race (the between-subject factor) and criminal history (the within-subject factor) on each of the three main outcome variables: hireability, promotability, and salary. Analyses for two of the three outcome variables yield a statistically significant two-way interaction between race and criminal history. Table 5a shows a statistically significant interaction between race and criminal history for evaluations of hireability ($F_{1,78} = 4.96$, $p<0.05$), and Table 5b shows a statistically significant interaction for evaluations of promotability ($F_{1,78} = 4.01$, $p<0.05$). The analyses for the hireability and promotability workplace outcome variables provide partial support for *Hypothesis 1*. However, analyses yield a statistically insignificant interaction between race and criminal history for evaluations of applicants starting salary, as shown in Table 5c.

Table 5a. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Hireability

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Race	1	41.01	**18.26*** **
Error (Between)	78	2.25	
Within Subjects Effects			
Criminal History	1	142.51	**51.88*** **
Race*Criminal History	1	13.81	**4.96***
Error (Within)	78	2.78	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5b. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Promotability

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Race	1	31.51	**10.12** **
Error (Between)	78	3.14	
Within Subjects Effects			
Criminal History	1	77.01	**40.36*** **
Race*Criminal History	1	7.66	**4.01***
Error (Within)	78	1.94	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5c. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Salary

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Race	1	213906250	3.03
Error (Between)	78	70587019.2	
Within Subjects Effects			
Criminal History	1	1775556250	**68.52*** **
Race*Criminal History	1	12656250	.49
Error (Within)	78	25913942.3	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Each of the analyses also yields a highly statistically significant main effect of the stigma of criminal history on the three outcome variables, and a significant main effect of race on hireability and promotability (see Tables 5a and 5b). Taken together, the results from the mixed ANOVA procedures provide partial support for *Hypothesis 1* and *1a*. As predicted, there is a significant status-stigma interaction effect on the workplace outcome variables of hireability and promotability. Contrary to my expectations, however, the interaction between race and criminal history does not reach statistical significance for the salary outcome (see Table 5c).

Table 5.1a. Simple Effects of Race on Hireability by Criminal History

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Criminal History	1	3.61	3.67
Criminal History	1	51.2	**12.65*** **

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5.1b. Simple Effects of Race on Promotability by Criminal History

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Criminal History	1	4.05	2.90
Criminal History	1	36.45	**9.89** **

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5.1c. Simple Effects of Race on Salary by Criminal History

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Criminal History	1	165312500	**3.04+**
Criminal History	1	61250000	1.45

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

To examine the interaction effects more closely and whether they unfold in the predicted manner, I also include one-way MANOVA analyses of the simple effects of criminal history on race for hireability, promotability, and starting salary. These results

are presented in Tables 5.1a-5.1c respectively. For both hireability and promotability, the effect of race is only significant for applicants with the stigma of criminal history. However, there is no significant difference in recommended starting salary between black and white applicants with a criminal history.

For hireability (Table 5.1a), analyses indicate that there is only a significant difference in evaluations scores between white and black applicants with a criminal history ($p<0.001$). There is no significant difference in evaluations of hireability between white and black applicants when no criminal history has been indicated for either applicant. Figure 5.1a illustrates this pattern, showing the mean differences by race and criminal history for evaluations of hireability. Black and white applicants with a criminal record receive significantly different evaluations of hireability ($p<0.001$), with black offenders receiving the lowest mean score.

Results show the same pattern for promotability (Table 5.1b): evaluations are significantly different for black and white applicants with a criminal history ($p<0.01$), but not for those without a criminal history. Figure 5.1b graphs this relationship, showing the mean differences for evaluations of promotability by race and criminal history. The graph in Figure 5.1b shows a larger, significant difference in evaluations of promotability for black and white applicants with a criminal record ($p<0.01$), but only a small, non-significant difference in evaluations between applicants without a criminal record. Mirroring the hireability outcome, black applicants with a criminal record also received the lowest mean evaluation score for promotion.

On the one hand, it is consistent with *Hypothesis 1* and *1a* that black and white applicants with a criminal record receive significantly different evaluations of hireability

and promotability, with black offenders receiving the lowest mean score. On the other, however, the race-criminal history interaction does not unfold in the exact manner I predicted using the logic of SCT. As there is no effect of race in the absence of criminal history for either outcome, the stigma of criminal history does not "intensify" the racial status characteristic as expected. Rather than "intensifying" the effects of race, criminal history appears to call out a racial effect in another manner.

Hypothesis 1 does not hold for evaluations of starting salary, however. Looking at the simple effects presented in Table 5.1c, there is a marginal difference in proposed starting salary between black and white applicants *without* a criminal record ($p<0.1$), but no significant difference in salary between black and white applicants *with* a criminal record. The estimated mean evaluation scores for starting salary are illustrated in Figure 5.1c.

Figure 5.1a. Estimated Marginal Means for Hireability by Race and Criminal History



Figure 5.1b. Estimated Marginal Means for Promotability by Race and Criminal History



Figure 5.1c. Estimated Marginal Means for Salary by Race and Criminal History



In sum, there is support for the status-stigma interaction between race and criminal history predicted in *Hypotheses 1* and *1a* for two of the three workplace outcomes in this study: hireability and promotability. Results indicate that evaluations of hireability and promotability are significantly different between black and white applicants with a criminal record, and that black applicants with a criminal history receive the lowest mean score. However, as race has no effect in the absence of stigma, results depart from *Hypothesis 1* and *1a* in that the interaction does not occur via the predicted intensification of the effect of race. Further, I do not find support for the predicted interaction effect when it comes to salary. Contrary to my expectations, there is no significant difference between the starting salaries suggested by participants for black and white applicants with a criminal record, which I will discuss further in Chapter 7.

The Race-Criminal History Interaction and its Effect on Moral and Performance Expectations

Before turning to an analysis of moral and performance expectations as mediating the race-criminal history interaction effect on workplace outcomes predicted in *Hypotheses 2* and *3*, I first examine the interaction effect on the two sets of expectations as dependent variables. To determine whether race and criminal history have an interactive effect on moral and performance expectations – and whether it is possible that they can operate as mediators for that effect – I include a mixed-design analysis of variance test for each set of expectations. The mixed analyses of variance for moral and performance expectations are presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.4.

These analyses indicate mixed results for whether the manipulated status and stigma variables affect the two types of expectations. For moral expectations (see Table

5.2), the main effects of race ($F_{1,78} = 12.03$, $p<0.001$) and criminal history ($F_{1,78} = 51.2$, $p<0.001$) are both significant. Most importantly, there is also a statistically significant effect of the race-criminal history interaction ($F_{1,78} = 16.24$, $p<0.001$) on moral expectations. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 provide more insight into the nature of the interaction. Together with Table 5.3, the graph in Figure 5.2 shows a significant difference in perceived moral character between black and white applicants with a criminal record ($p<0.001$), but not between applicants without a criminal record – mirroring previous effects. Further, the figure also reveals that black applicants with a criminal record received the lowest scores with respect to perceived moral character.

Table 5.2. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Moral Expectations

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Race	1	16.51	**12.03*** **
Error (Between)	78	1.37	
Within Subjects Effects			
Criminal History	1	40.6	**51.2*** **
Race*Criminal History	1	12.89	**16.24*** **
Error (Within)	78	.80	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5.3. Simple Effects of Race on Moral Expectations by Criminal History

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Criminal History	1	0.12	0.14
Criminal History	1	29.30	**21.3*** **

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 5.2. Estimated Marginal Means for Moral Expectations by Race and Criminal History



By contrast, the manipulated status and stigma variables do not have the predicted interaction effect on performance expectations (as shown in Table 5.4). Although there is a significant main effect of the stigma of criminal history ($F_{1,78} = 10.53$, $p<0.01$), the main effect of race does not reach statistical significance and, contrary to *Hypothesis 3*, there is no interaction effect between race and criminal history. As there is no interaction effect, these results suggest that performance expectations cannot mediate the effects of race and criminal history on workplace outcomes as proposed in *Hypothesis 3*. For descriptive purposes, the estimated means for performance expectations by race and criminal history are presented in Figure 5.3.

Table 5.4. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Performance Expectations

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Race	1	2.7	2.16
Error (Between)	78	1.25	
Within Subjects Effects			
Criminal History	1	8.68	**10.53****
Race*Criminal History	1	.24	.3
Error (Within)	78	.82	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 5.3. Estimated Marginal Means for Performance Expectations by Race and Criminal History



In the previous discussion of results, I established preliminary support for certain components of *Hypotheses 1* and *1a*, which predict that race and criminal history will interact in their effects on the main workplace outcomes analyzed in this study. Although support for *Hypothesis 1* is not complete given the lack of an "intensification effect" governing the interaction – nor universal as the results for the salary outcome are inconsistent with its predictions – there is strong support for the status-stigma interaction on hireability and promotability. Across the same two outcomes, there is also strong support that race and criminal history interact to affect moral expectations, or the perceived moral character of applicants. Because race and criminal history significantly influence moral expectations, the results suggest that perceptions of morality could

potentially mediate the status-stigma interaction as predicted in *Hypothesis 2* and *2a*. However, the status and stigma variables do not interact to affect performance expectations, and thus it is not likely that perceptions of competence will mediate the relationship as predicted in *Hypothesis 3* and *3a*. And, given that performance expectations constitutes the central mechanism by which status influences outcomes, this may explain the lack of status effect of race – another issue I discuss further in Chapter 7.

Given the nature of the mixed design in this study, it is not possible to use an analysis of variance test to fully assess the mediating effects of moral and performance expectations within the full mediated moderation model. As such, the next section describes the results from the conditional process analysis, which allows for a formal examination of whether moral and performance expectations mediate the relationship between the race-criminal history interaction and workplace outcomes.

Full Mediated Moderation Analysis

In this section, I turn to the results of the conditional process analysis of the full mediated-moderation model: the relationship between the race-criminal history interaction and workplace outcomes (hireability, promotability, and starting salary) predicted in *Hypothesis 1* and *1a,* mediated by moral (*Hypothesis 2* and *2a*) and performance (*Hypothesis 3* and *3a*) expectations.

Table 5.5. Mediated Moderation Analysis of Workplace Outcomes, Race & Criminal History (N = 160)

	Moral Expectations	**Performance Expectations**	**Hireability**	**Promotability**	**Salary**
Black	-0.08	-0.18	-0.34	-0.35	**-3072.14+**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(1572.47)
Criminal History	**-0.44+**	**-0.39+**	**-0.94****	**-0.56+**	**7225.00*****
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(1557.32)
Black * Criminal History	**-1.14*****	-0.16	-.38	-0.13	1342.83
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(2202.38)
Moral Expectations	-	-	**-0.68*****	**-0.64*****	-45.82
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(890.34)
Performance Expectations	-	-	0.17	0.28	-172.01
			(0.15)	(0.15)	(449.93)
Intercept	7.59***	7.84***	8.38***	1.05***	43149.69***
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(1613.03)
F Statistic	21.55***	3.73*	15.65***	27.17***	8.49***
R^2	0.29	0.07	0.52	0.47	0.22

Note: Robust bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5.5 displays the mediated moderation results for Experiment 1. As in the previous analyses, there is a strong, negative interaction effect between being black and having a criminal history on moral expectations ($p<0.001$). Specifically, this effect indicates that black applicants with a criminal record receive significantly lower evaluations of moral character than other applicants. As is also consistent with previous results, there is no such interaction effect on performance expectations. Thus, black applicants with a criminal record are not perceived as significantly less competent than the other applicants, which is inconsistent with my original expectations drawn from SCT and from theories of stigma and stigmatization (Goffman 1963, Link and Phelan 2001). However, there is a negative effect of criminal history that reaches the threshold for marginal significance for both moral expectations and performance expectations. This finding suggests that the stigma of criminal history has an independent effect that drives down perceptions of moral character and competence regardless of applicants' race.

Importantly, the mediated moderation model provides substantial support for *Hypothesis 2* and *2a*. Consistent with my predictions in *Hypothesis 2a,* moral expectations mediate the interaction between being black and having a criminal record for hireability and promotability. In particular, black applicants with a criminal record are significantly less likely to be recommended for hire and to be recommended for promotion because they are perceived as lacking in moral character. Further, it is important to note that moral expectations fully mediate the interaction, given that the direct effect of the interaction fails to reach statistical significance. The predicted mediating effect of moral expectations does not hold for proposed salary, however.

Contrary to my predictions in *Hypotheses 3 and 3a* drawn from cumulative research in SCT, performance expectations do not have the same mediating effect for any of the workplace outcomes considered in this study. In other words, perceived competence does not help to explain the relationship between the race-criminal history interaction and workplace outcomes. In figures 5.4 and 5.5, and 5.6, I present path diagrams of the mediated moderation models for the three workplace outcomes, including coefficients and their significance levels.

Figure 5.4. Mediated Moderation Model Path Diagram for Hireability



Figure 5.5. Mediated Moderation Model Path Diagram for Promotability



Figure 5.6. Mediated Moderation Model Path Diagram for Salary



To conclude, the moderated mediation analysis of Experiment 1 provides substantial, though not universal, support for *Hypothesis 2a*. Moral expectations fully mediate the race-criminal history interaction effect on the hireability and promotability outcomes. However, *Hypothesis 2a* does not hold for the salary outcome as moral expectations have no effect on this measure, nor is there a significant interaction effect on salary across any of the analyses. Likewise, *Hypothesis 3a*, the predicted mediating effect of performance expectations, does not hold across any of the three workplace outcomes. As performance expectations were not a factor in participant's evaluations of applicants like SCT would predict, this may help to explain the lack of status effects in the experiment.

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 – GENDER AND MENTAL ILLNESS

In this chapter, I report the results from the second experimental test of my main hypotheses regarding the status-stigma interaction (*Hypothesis 1*) and the mediating role of moral and performance expectations (*Hypothesis 2* and *Hypothesis 3*). I examine these hypotheses in Experiment 2 using the case of *gender and mental illness*.

In contrast to the status-stigma combination of race and criminal history examined in Experiment 1, far less is known about the potential interaction between gender and mental illness. However, from the small body of research that closely examines these characteristics (Smith-Rosenberg 1972, Schur 1984, Wirth and Bodenhausen 2009), I predict in *Hypothesis 1b* that the presence or absence of the stigma of mental illness will interact with the status characteristic of gender to intensify disadvantage in the workplace. I expect that this will occur because of the strong beliefs about character and competence associated with a stigma like mental illness, which are also bound up in the status characteristic of gender. As I have argued, I expect that stereotypical qualities of moral character associated with women – that they are overly emotional, sensitive, unstable, or erratic – are likely to be activated and magnified by a stigma like mental illness. More precisely, I predict in *Hypothesis 2b* that moral expectations will mediate the interaction between gender and mental illness. Finally, I also predict that performance expectations will mediate the interaction, as stated in *Hypothesis 3b*, because a mental illness will drive down performance expectations associated with the devalued status state of gender.

The specific theoretical model that I examine with respect to the second set of status (gender) and stigmatized (mental illness) characteristics is presented in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Theoretical Model of the Mediated Gender-Mental Illness Interaction and its Effect on Workplace Evaluations



The Gender-Mental Illness Interaction and its Effect on Workplace Outcomes

In this section, I empirically examine my predictions stated in *Hypothesis 1b* regarding the gender-mental illness test case: *The negative effects of being female (versus male) on workplace outcomes will be intensified when combined with the stigma of mental illness.* To test for the predicted gender-mental illness interaction, I present a mixed ANOVA of participants' mean workplace evaluation scores with respect to applicant gender and mental illness on each of the three workplace outcome variables: hireability, promotability, and salary. Recall, I use a mixed-design ANOVA because of

the nature of the two factors in the experimental design where gender is the between-subjects factor and mental illness is the within-subjects factor.

Analyses for two of the three workplace outcomes yield a statistically significant two-way interaction between gender and mental illness. Turning to Table 6a, there is a significant interaction between gender and mental illness for evaluations of hireability ($F_{1,78} = 15.19$, $p<0.001$). And as shown in Table 6b, there is also a significant interaction for evaluations of promotability ($F_{1,78} = 6.88$, $p<0.01$). While the results for hireability and promotability strongly support the status-stigma intensification hypotheses, the same is not true for evaluations of starting salary. As in Experiment 1, and contrary to *Hypothesis 1* and *1b*, the status-stigma interaction for gender and mental illness fails to reach statistical significance with respect to the salary outcome (see Table 6c).

Table 6a. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Hireability

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Gender	1	25.6	**7.98****
Error (Between)	78	3.21	
Within Subjects Effects			
Mental Illness	1	75.63	**28.72*****
Gender*Mental Illness	1	40	**15.19*****
Error (Within)	78	2.63	

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1

Table 6b. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Promotability

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Gender	1	15.26	**6.34****
Error (Between)	78	2.46	
Within Subjects Effects			
Mental Illness	1	46.23	**22.02*****
Gender*Mental Illness	1	14.4	**6.88****
Error (Within)	78	2.10	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 6c. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Salary

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Gender	1	552792250	**6.33***
Error (Between)	78	87251432.7	
Within Subjects Effects			
Mental Illness	1	351649000	**16.34*****
Gender*Mental Illness	1	11990250	.55
Error (Within)	78	21516419.9	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

The mixed ANOVA analyses presented in Tables 6a – 6c also reveal a significant main effect of the stigma of mental illness for hireability, promotability, and salary. There is also a significant main effect of gender across the outcomes. However, this effect occurs across both stigma conditions, and must be examined further by breaking down the interaction into its component effects.

Table 6.1a. Simple Effects of Gender on Hireability by Mental Illness

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Mental Illness	1	.80	.44
Mental Illness	1	64.8	**16.14*** **

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 6.1b. Simple Effects of Gender on Promotability by Mental Illness

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Mental Illness	1	.01	.01
Mental Illness	1	30.01	**8.92** **

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 6.1c. Simple Effects of Gender on Salary by Mental Illness

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Mental Illness	1	363804500	**7.82****
Mental Illness	1	200978000	**3.23**+

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

To examine the nature of the status-stigma interactions, I use one-way MANOVA analyses to break down the interaction into its component simple effects. Results presented in Tables 6.1a and 6.1b indicate that the status effect of gender is stronger for applicants with the stigma of mental illness than without for evaluations of hireability and promotability, as predicted in *Hypothesis 1* and *1b*. For hireability (see Table 6.1a), participant evaluations are significantly different between male and female applicants with a mental illness (p<0.001), but not between male and female applicants without a mental illness. In Figure 6.1a, the differences in mean hireability scores between applicants with and without a mental illness are striking: there is a large, significant difference in scores between male and female applicants with a mental illness (p<0.001), with female applicants with a mental illness faring worse than their male counterparts. Further, there is only a small, non-significant difference between applicants without a mental illness. And, surprisingly, female applicants without a mental illness actually score slightly *higher* (although not significantly so) on evaluations of hireability than male applicants.

The same general pattern holds for evaluations of promotability. The mean scores for this outcome are significantly different between male and female applicants with a

mental illness ($p<0.01$), but not between male and female applicants without a mental illness. Figure 6.1b shows the substantial gap in scores for male and female applicants with a mental illness ($p<0.01$), with female applicants with a mental illness ranked the lowest on promotability.

For the mean scores for recommended salary (see Table 6.1c), however, there is only a marginal difference between male and female applicants with a mental illness ($p<0.1$). In fact, there is a larger difference in recommended salary between male and female applicants *without a mental illness* ($p<0.01$). Further, it is clear in Figure 6.3 that there is no interaction between gender and mental illness for salary; the graph illustrates additive effects between the two variables instead. Results for this outcome are out of sync with *Hypothesis 1* and *1b,* which suggests that gender and mental illness will interact in their effects on salary.

Figure 6.1a. Estimated Marginal Means for Hireability by Gender and Mental Illness



Figure 6.1b. Estimated Marginal Means for Promotability by Gender and Mental Illness



Figure 6.1c. Estimated Marginal Means for Salary by Gender and Mental Illness



In sum, the results for Experiment 2 presented in this section are largely consistent with those for Experiment 1. There is support for the status-stigma interaction between gender and mental illness predicted in *Hypotheses 1* and *1a* for two of the three workplace outcomes in this study: hireability and promotability. Results indicate that evaluations of hireability and promotability are significantly different between female and male applicants with a mental illness, and that female applicants with a mental illness receive the lowest mean score. However, results diverge from *Hypothesis 1* and *1a* in that the interaction does not occur through the intensification of the effect of gender. Further, results do not support predicted interaction effect for salary. Contrary to my expectations, there is no significant difference in suggested starting salaries between female and male

applicants with a mental illness. I discuss issues related to my argument for an "intensification" effect as well as issues related to the salary outcome further in Chapter 7.

The Gender-Mental Illness Interaction and its Effect on Moral and Performance Expectations

Before moving on to the full mediated moderation model for Experiment 2, I first assess the effects that the status characteristic of gender and the stigma of mental illness have on moral and performance expectations. To examine whether gender and mental illness interact to affect the two sets of expectations, I include two mixed-design analyses of variance with moral and performance expectations as dependent variables. The mixed analyses of variance for moral and performance expectations are presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.4.

As in Experiment 1, there are mixed results for whether the manipulated status and stigma variables affect moral and performance expectations as proposed mediating measures. For moral expectations, results suggest that gender and mental illness have a significant interactive effect on perceived moral character ($F_{1,78} = 4.19$, $p<0.05$). In addition, the main effects of gender ($F_{1,78} = 9.93$, $p<0.01$) and mental illness ($F_{1,78} = 27.36$, $p<0.001$) are each significant on their own. Looking more closely at the gender-mental illness interaction and its effect on moral expectations, Table 6.3 reveals a significant difference in moral expectations between men and women with the stigma of mental illness ($p<0.01$), but not between men and women without a mental illness. Figure 6.2 illustrates these differences between applicants – showing a much larger, significant

gap in perceived moral character between men and women with a mental illness than without. And it is also evident in the figure that women with a mental illness fared the worst on evaluations of morality.

Table 6.2. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Moral Expectations

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Gender	1	15.63	**9.93****
Error (Between)	78	1.57	
Within Subjects Effects			
Mental Illness	1	25.92	**27.36*****
Gender*Mental Illness	1	3.97	**4.19***
Error (Within)	78	.95	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 6.3. Simple Effects of Gender on Moral Expectations by Mental Illness

Source	d.f.	MS	F
No Mental Illness	1	1.92	2.44
Mental Illness	1	17.67	**10.19****

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 6.2. Estimated Marginal Means for Moral Expectations by Gender and Mental Illness



For performance expectations, however, the manipulated gender and mental illness do not have the predicted interaction effect (see Table 6.4). Although there is a significant main effect of the stigma of mental illness ($F_{1,78} = 350.57$, $p<0.001$), the main effect of gender does not reach statistical significance and, contrary to *Hypothesis 3*, there is no interaction effect between gender and mental illness. As in Experiment 1, the results in this section suggest that performance expectations may not mediate the effects of gender and mental illness on workplace outcomes as proposed in *Hypothesis 3*. For descriptive purposes, the estimated means for performance expectations by gender and mental illness are included in Figure 6.3.

Table 6.4. Mixed Analysis of Variance Results for Performance Expectations

Source	d.f.	MS	F
Between Subjects Effects			
Gender	1	.04	.05
Error (Between)	78	.72	
Within Subjects Effects			
Mental Illness	1	221.29	**350.57*** **
Gender*Mental Illness	1	1.38	2.18
Error (Within)	78	.63	

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 6.3. Estimated Marginal Means for Performance Expectations by Gender and Mental Illness



Full Mediated Moderation Analysis

In this section, I present a formal analysis of the mediating effects of moral expectations and performance expectations predicted in *Hypotheses 2* and *3*. To recall, *Hypothesis 2a*, which is specific to the gender and mental illness case, states: *Moral expectations will significantly mediate the interaction between gender and mental illness*. Similarly, *Hypothesis 3a* states: *Performance expectations will also significantly mediate the interaction between gender and mental illness*. Here, I use a conditional process analysis to test full mediated moderation model (see Figure 6), which includes a formal test of each of the hypotheses that pertain to Experiment 2.

The mediated moderation results are presented in Table 6.5. In keeping with the analysis of variance results, there is a negative interaction effect between being female and having a mental illness on moral expectations that reaches the threshold for marginal significance ($p<0.1$), but no interaction effect on performance expectations. Further, mental illness also has a marginally significant effect on moral expectations ($p<0.1$). What is especially of note here, however, is that mental illness has a much stronger negative effect on performance expectations ($p<0.001$), regardless of the applicant's gender -- as also shown in Table 6.4. This suggests that mental illness has a sweeping effect on perceived competence of *both* men and women. Finally, there are no significant gender effects on either moral or performance expectations, which suggests that character and competence perceptions are not significantly lower for women than for men as I initially predicted using the logic of SCT.

In the full model, with moral and performance expectations included as mediators, the interaction between being female and having a mental illness remains significant for hireability ($p<0.001$) and marginally significant for promotability ($p<0.1$). However, the indirect effects of moral expectations are also marginally significant for both of these workplace outcomes. This provides evidence that moral expectations partially mediate the interaction between being female and having a mental illness in terms of likelihood to hire and promote. I interpret these findings as offering preliminary, albeit limited, support for *Hypothesis 2*[10]. However, this is only a partial mediation, as the direct effect of the gender-mental illness interaction remains significant in the model.

[10] Given the small participant pool, and that the indirect effect of moral expectations is in the predicted direction and reaches the threshold for marginal significance, I interpret the results as generally supportive of *Hypothesis 2b*.

Although the results for hireability and promotability are generally supportive of *Hypotheses 2* and *2b,* these predictions do not pan out for starting salary. Moral expectations do not have a statistically significant effect on this outcome, nor does the gender-mental illness interaction reach statistical significance. Though there is a marginally significant gender effect on salary – with female applicants receiving lower starting salaries than male applicants – there is no support for *Hypotheses 1, 2,* or *3* with respect to the salary outcome in either experiment. In Chapter 7, I discuss the lack of support for any of my initial predictions with respect to the salary outcome and the implications of these results for the argument and theoretical process developed in this study.

Further, as the ANOVA results in the previous section foreshadowed, performance expectations do not mediate the interaction on hireability or promotability. That is, perceived competence does not account for the intensification of disadvantage related to being female and having mental illness on these outcomes. Based on these results, and the results in the previous section, there is resolutely no support *Hypothesis 3b*.

Table 6.5. Mediated Moderation Analysis of Workplace Outcomes, Gender & Mental Illness (N = 160)

	Moral Expectations	**Performance Expectations**	**Hireability**	**Promotability**	**Salary**
Female	-0.31	-0.16	0.49	0.26	**-2596.37+**
	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(1596.26)
Mental Illness	**-0.49+**	**-2.54*** **	-0.70	0.22	2706.43
	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.47)	(0.38)	(2409.77)
Female * Mental Illness	**-0.63+**	0.37	**-1.60*** **	**-0.68+**	-1187.03
	(0.36)	(0.26)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(2304.73)
Moral Expectations	-	-	**-0.51+**	**-0.56+**	-589.75
			(0.34)	(0.32)	(517.41)
Performance Expectations	-	-	0.10	0.04	681.78
			(0.10)	(0.06)	(586.26)
Intercept	7.74***	7.70***	-0.49***	.25	19855.41***
	(0.18)	(0.13)	(1.13)	(0.91)	(5805.53)
F Statistic	12.04***	109.67***	31.15***	38.53***	6.49***
R^2	0.19	0.68	0.50	0.56	0.17

Note: Robust bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

To conclude, the mediated moderation analysis provides support for the prediction that moral expectations mediate the gender-mental illness interaction for two of the three workplace outcomes (hireability and promotability). Female applicants with mental illnesses were evaluated lower on moral character, which produced a disproportionate disadvantage on important workplace outcomes – lessening the likelihood that participants would recommend these applicants for hire and eventual promotion. However, the direct effect of the gender-mental illness interaction stays significant in the full model, which means that moral expectations only partially mediate this process. While moral expectations do operate as a mechanism that drives some of the disadvantage that women with mental illnesses face in the hiring scenario, the results suggest that there are likely other mechanisms influencing the status-stigma interaction as well – an issue I expand upon in Chapter 7. The model provides no support for *Hypothesis 3b*, however, regarding the predicted mediating role of performance expectations. The lack of mediation by performance expectations may explain why status was not activated across the experiments, which I also discuss further in the next chapter. Figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 show path diagrams of the mediated moderation models for workplace outcomes, including coefficients and their significance levels.

Figure 6.4. Mediated Moderation Model Path Diagram for Hireability



Figure 6.5. Mediated Moderation Model Path Diagram for Promotability



Figure 6.6. Mediated Moderation Model Path Diagram for Salary



CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

The experimental results from this study provide support for important aspects of the theoretical framework I have advanced to better understand how status and stigma cause bias in consequential social contexts. Across the two experiments, there is strong evidence for a status-stigma interaction where individuals who are stigmatized and status-disadvantaged fare significantly worse than their counterparts across important workplace outcomes. However, the interaction did not unfold in the manner I anticipated. As there were no status effects related to race or gender in the absence of stigma, the stigmas of criminal history and mental illness did not "intensify" the negative effects of devalued status states normally observed in SCT research. This is likely because performance expectations – as the central mechanism through which status characteristics affect outcomes – were not invoked in the experimental situation as I initially predicted they would be in *Hypothesis 3*. However, there is still a status-stigma interaction effect for the majority of outcomes in both experiments. This suggests that status – when paired with a stigma – is still in play. However, the combined effects of status and stigma observed here diverge entirely from status organizing processes established in SCT.

Beyond the status-stigma interaction, results also support *Hypothesis 2,* the predicted mediating role of moral expectations. In fact, moral expectations play an even more central role in this process than expected. As performance expectations have no effect, moral expectations serve as the only mechanism in the study that helps to explain the relationship between the status-stigma interaction and workplace outcomes. Thus there is clear evidence for the crux of my argument: the intensely moral nature of stigmas–that they evoke strong perceptions of low character and moral worth–activate

underlying moral dimensions of status characteristics. And when this moral dimension becomes activated, moral expectations play a significant mediating role in how status and stigma interact to affect outcomes in a context like the workplace. In this chapter, I discuss the results of the two experiments, providing an overview of central findings and their implications for theory, including social psychological theories of status and stigma as well as more general theories of inequality. Though the results are supportive of part of the theoretical logic I develop in this dissertation, there are several unexpected – and theoretically inconsistent – findings related to the expected role of status and performance expectations. I begin with a discussion of the nature of the status-stigma interaction considering the lack of status effects and its implications for the argument presented here, as well as for existing theory. I then discuss the role of moral expectations as a mechanism of status- and stigma-based bias. Finally, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of other issues, unexpected findings, and limitations of the study.

The Status-Stigma Interaction

Across both experiments, there is evidence that supports the main component of *Hypothesis 1*: that status and stigma will interact in their effects on workplace outcomes. However, the status-stigma interaction occurred in a different manner than I predicted. To recall, I predicted in *Hypothesis 1* that *status and stigma will interact in their effects on workplace outcomes, with the negative effects of a devalued status state intensified when combined with a stigmatized characteristic.* In both experiments, the results for the hireability and promotability outcomes indicate strong support for the status-stigma interaction. However, as there were no status effects of race (in Experiment 1) or gender

(in Experiment 2) in the absence of stigma, the results do not support the latter part of the hypothesis regarding the intensification of the negative effects of status. That is, the negative effects of a devalued status state could not have been "intensified" by a stigmatized characteristic as there were no negative effects of status in either experimental case. Despite consistent support for the status-stigma interaction – albeit in a slightly different form than predicted – this support was not universal. Status and stigma did not interact to affect the salary outcome in either case. I discuss this unexpected finding across the two experiments later in this section.

In Experiment 1, the stigma of criminal history appears to call out – rather than intensify – negative effects of the devalued state of the status characteristic of race (or being black versus being white) for the majority of workplace outcomes in the study. However, as there is no difference in evaluations of hireability and promotability between black and white applicants without a criminal record, the stigma of criminal history cannot "intensify" the effects of race. In Experiment 2, we see the same pattern. For the same outcomes, a mental illness triggers – rather than intensifies – a gender effect. Contrary to my predictions informed by SCT, women without a mental illness did not receive significantly different evaluations of hireability or promotability than men without mental illness. In fact, women without mental illness often had higher (although not significantly so) ratings on these outcomes than men. Thus, a mental illness did not "intensify" the devalued status state of gender. Though the predicted status-stigma interaction effect emerges across the two experiments, the total lack of status effects complicates the nature of this interaction in light of the argument I have advanced throughout this dissertation drawing in part on SCT. In the next section, I explain these

unexpected findings and how they might be part and parcel of yet another unpredicted finding: the lack of mediation by performance expectations.

The Lack of Status Effects and the Puzzle of Performance Expectations

Although the experimental results do not indicate universal support for the status-stigma interaction predicted in *Hypothesis 1* across all outcomes, results for the majority of outcomes do support the hypothesized interaction effect. Unexpectedly, however, this interaction does not occur through the intensification of status effects as I originally predicted. At the outset, I predicted that findings would diverge from recent bridging work that suggests status and stigma drive inequality in similar ways, converging in many of their core processes. Specifically, Lucas and Phelan (2012) argue that stigmatized characteristics operate according to central status processes – particularly processes related to influence and how specific status characteristics can mitigate the effects of diffuse status characteristics. Other theoretical considerations of status and stigma also suggest that stigmatized characteristics are more conceptually similar to status characteristics than they are different (Wagner 1993). While this work argues that there is overlap between the two characteristics, findings from this study suggests that the way status and stigma aggregate to affect outcomes departs even more dramatically from these arguments than I anticipated – diverging entirely from status organizing processes.

I believe the total lack of status processes stems from the fact that performance expectations were not evoked in the experiments. Decades of theorizing and research in SCT has assumed that performance expectations operate as the central mechanism of status-based inequality. Specifically, work within the expectation states tradition argues

that status characteristics – like the ones discussed throughout this dissertation – evoke shared beliefs and perceptions about competence that differentially affect individual outcomes (Ridgeway et al. 1998, Ridgeway et al. 2000, Correll et al. 2007). Thus, it is puzzling to say the least that the status variables do not affect performance expectations. And although the stigmatized characteristics in the study do influence perceived competence – as prominent work on stigma would suggest (Goffman 1963, Sibicky and Dovidio 1986, Link and Phelan 2001, Lucas and Phelan 2012) – it is surprising that performance expectations do not also mediate the relationship between the status-stigma interaction and workplace outcomes in either of the experiments. While this is unexpected, it likely explains why there were no status effects in either experiment. Without invoking differential performance expectations, there is no other mechanism by which status would affect outcomes under the logic of SCT.

One explanation for the lack of mediation by performance expectations, and the subsequent lack of status effects, is that perceptions of competence are conditioned by the task at hand or, in a hiring scenario, the type of job in question. Although one of the core tenets of SCT is that performance expectations associated with different status states arise in task-oriented situations, the task itself is usually taken as given. That is, the logic of the theory should hold across many different kinds of task-oriented situations – whether they be juries, sports teams, or work groups. In an employment or hiring scenario, however, the level of the open position and the type of job is likely to affect evaluations of competence and also the *importance* of those evaluations. In this study, I made an intentional decision to select an entry level position with very few required skills so that other status characteristics (like education) would not also be operating on the outcomes,

and so that the job did not seem out of reach for the types of candidates applying. However, because it was an entry-level position that required few existing skills and qualifications, participants may have believed that candidates did not need to have exceptionally high levels of competence to perform it.

As this study uses a modified version of the experimental situation and procedures in Correll and colleagues (2007) study of the motherhood penalty, it is revealing to examine the differences between the two with respect performance expectations. In addition to including applicants with a stigmatized characteristic, one of the major differences in the experimental scenarios across the two studies is the type of job described in the cover story. Participants in Correll and colleague's (2007) experiments evaluated mock applicants for an upper-level professional position, which required a highly skilled and competent candidate. Thus, the items that make up the performance expectations measure may have become especially important in evaluating applicants on workplace outcomes for this type of position. In the present study, however, the advertised position was for an entry-level job, which required only very basic skills. This may have even resulted in lower status applicants being judged as more suitable for the position – higher status applicants may have been regarded as *too* competent for the job.

This interpretation may help to explain the unexpected directions of the coefficients with respect to gender in Experiment 2. While the effect of being female is not significant on performance expectations, it is negative – as would be predicted. However, the effects of being female on hireability and promotability, while also not statistically significant, are positive, meaning that female applicants without a mental illness may have been preferred over male applicants without a mental illness in some

cases. While this is paradoxical considering the logic of SCT, it is possible that participants thought female applicants – while perhaps perceived as less competent – might be more appropriate or better suited than men for the entry-level job.

One takeaway from the unexpected findings related to status and performance expectations could be that the experimental scenario did not activate the status characteristics in question – violating the *salience assumption* of SCT. However, the status-stigma interaction observed across the two experiments clearly demonstrates that status does have an effect when paired with a stigma. Thus, a parallel conclusion is that the current formulation of SCT does not consider important dimensions of status that can become activated by a social stigma in certain contexts, such as particular sectors of the labor market. When high levels of competence are not necessary – like in entry-level or low skill jobs – there are other types of expectations tied to status characteristics that can still come into play when those characteristics are combined with stigmatized attributes. As typical status processes do not unfold in the experiments, the persistence of a status-stigma interaction observed across the two cases underscores the significance of my argument about morality: the stigmatized characteristics considered here unmistakably activate underlying moral dimensions of status characteristics. As I discuss further in the next section, this study provides compelling evidence for the argument that moral expectations should be considered as a mechanism related to status, and as a central feature in synthetic theories that seek to bridge status and stigma.

Findings related to the nature of the status-stigma interaction have several important theoretical implications for considering the combined effects of status and stigma in contexts like the labor market. While others have called for the inclusion of

stigmatized characteristics like mental illness into SCT (Wagner 1993, Lucas and Phelan 2012), this study suggests that stigmas can activate unique processes that differ entirely from current status order logic. This is the first study to offer a viable, empirically tested framework capable of examining divergences related to the two concepts in this manner. Specifically, findings offer preliminary support for a new, synthetic theory that treats status and stigma as distinct characteristics that – when paired – follow a unique process that leads to unequal outcomes for individuals. This study then lays the groundwork for the development of a theory that encapsulates divergent processes related to the two characteristics.

The Role of Moral Expectations

As I have suggested, there is also compelling evidence that moral expectations mediate the relationship between the status-stigma interaction and certain workplace outcomes. In *Hypothesis 2*, I predicted that *moral expectations will significantly mediate the interaction between status characteristics and stigma in their effect on workplace evaluations.* Across both experiments, the results for the hireability and promotability outcomes support this prediction. For each of these outcomes, findings suggest that moral expectations drive at least some of the disadvantage that stems from having a devalued status state and a stigma.

In Experiment 1, the status characteristic of race and the stigma of criminal history interacted in their effects on hireability and promotability. That is, there is only a status effect of race for applicants with a criminal history, with black applicants with a criminal history receiving the lowest evaluations of hireability and promotability. Further,

the results from the mediated moderation analysis show that being black and having a criminal record has a dramatic negative influence on moral expectations, and that moral expectations fully mediate the interaction effect. In other words, moral expectations are responsible for the intensification of disadvantage related to race and criminal history. Participants judged black applicants with criminal records to be less trustworthy, honest, and responsible – among other things – and thus less fit for hire and promotion. In fact, perceptions of moral character play an even bigger role in this process than expected. Originally, I predicted that *both* moral and performance expectations would mediate the effects of race and criminal history. As the only significant mediator, however, moral expectations far outweigh the role of performance expectations.

In Experiment 2, the status characteristic of gender and the stigma of mental illness also interacted in their effects on evaluations of hireability and promotability. Specifically, there is only a gender penalty for applicants who had the stigma of mental illness – with female applicants who had a mental illness receiving the lowest evaluations of hireablity and promotability. Moreover, mediated moderation results show that this gender-mental illness penalty also diminished perceptions of moral character, and that moral expectations partially mediate the interaction effect on workplace outcomes. Thus moral expectations drive some of the disadvantage related to gender and mental illness as predicted in *Hypothesis 2*.

What Else Mediates the Gender-Mental Illness Interaction?

Unlike in Experiment 1, however, moral expectations only partially mediate the gender-mental illness interaction. As moral expectations are only partly responsible for

the disadvantage that female applicants with mental illness face on certain workplace outcomes, there are likely other mechanisms involved in this case. Substantive research on gender and on mental illness provides insights into what else might be at play. Benard and Correll (2010), for instance, apply SCT to examine other mechanisms – aside from performance expectations or perceived competence – that influence gender inequality in the workplace. They find that there are an array of other qualities that disadvantage certain women in the labor market, such as perceived likeability and warmth. Just as the stigma of mental illness activates moral beliefs bound up with gender and femininity, it may also activate beliefs like these. Indeed, research in psychology has found that negative public attitudes toward individuals with mental illness include perceptions of likability (Rabkin 1974) and friendliness (Wahl and Roth 1982). Given the importance of proper display of these qualities in normative gendered interactions (Goffman 1961b, Hochschild 1979), beliefs about likability, friendliness, and warmth are likely to disproportionately affect women who exhibit mental illness (Schur 1984).

In addition, research on stigma suggests a number of mechanisms unique to processes of stigmatization that might help to drive the status-stigma intensification effect that we see with gender and mental illness. One of the most prominent of these is social distance, or "the deliberate effort to avoid another or exclude that other from social interaction" (Lucas and Phelan 2012:311). Interactions with a stigmatized person can result in social distancing due to a lack of "social ordering schema" (Phelan et al. 2014) – not knowing what to expect from or how to behave around the individual. If a mental illness diminishes perceived moral character – and perhaps perceptions of likability and warmth – for women in particular, it may also result in more extreme social distancing.

Moral Expectations and Evidence for a New Aggregation Principle

Although the effect of moral expectations differs in magnitude across the two experiments, it does help to explain the status-stigma interaction in both cases. These findings help to resolve the second central question I have raised in this study: if there is evidence that status and stigma interact to diminish outcomes for individuals, what mechanisms drive this interaction effect? SCT demonstrates that status characteristics combine to influence aggregated performance expectations, which then differentially affect outcomes (Correll and Ridgeway 2003). With evidence that stigmatized characteristics do not follow this status organizing process, however, it is likely that there are other mechanisms – aside from performance expectations – at work in how status and stigma combine to produce inequality.

Although early formulations of the expectation states framework, and SCT in particular, have argued that other types of expectations could influence the relationship between individual attributes like status characteristics and outcomes (Berger et al. 1992), no research in SCT has tested this possibility. Findings here demonstrate that other types of expectations can become activated, especially when status characteristics are combined with stigmatized attributes. Further, moral expectations help to explain precisely why stigmatized characteristics diverge from status organizing processes – resulting in more (rather than less) disadvantage when paired with a devalued status state. Though more cases will need to be tested, the results provide support for moral expectations as a new mechanism of status and stigma-based bias. If examination of other

cases yield further support, future research may argue for incorporating these insights as a new principle that guides the aggregation of status characteristics and stigmas.

The Salary Outcome

Across the two experiments, I found no support for any of my hypotheses when it came to the salary outcome. The predicted effects of moral and performance expectations were not significant in either case, nor was the status-stigma interaction. Rather than interpreting this as a substantive finding, I believe the lack of significant results for this outcome stems from design issues related to the salary question itself within the experimental questionnaire.

To provide a meaningful range of potential starting salaries for participants to choose from, the applicant evaluation questionnaire asked participants to recommend a starting salary between the amounts of $25,000-55,000. This range was chosen based on common starting salaries for entry-level positions in information services and related fields. Within this range, however, participants had no anchor for what might be considered a "good" or "bad," or "high" or "low," starting salary for the mock applicants in the pool. Thus, participants' recommendations spanned a large range of values that may not have necessarily corresponded with each of the manipulated variables.

In the debriefing after the experiment, participants often made comments that they did not know conventions for typical salaries for the specific type of job used in the cover story – many indicating that they chose amounts somewhat randomly. Participant demographics may have come into play to affect this outcome as well. As undergraduate students, their understandings of salaried employment in general were somewhat limited,

usually not having experience in a salaried position. In this study, and in other research that makes use of similar mock hiring scenarios, it may be useful to provide an anchor for participants as to what might constitute a "high," "medium," or "low" salary within a given range, or to provide a different sort of scale.

Generalizations and Parting Cautions

One of the most common questions posed of experimental research concerns their external validity – how generalizable are they to natural settings? This study begins with a theoretical question, and thus aims to generalize to theory. In many ways, this strategy of generalization is an asset. Because the results of experimental studies generalize to theory – rather than to a specific cases or contexts – they can be very broadly applied. The findings from this study are wide-ranging in that they can help to further our theoretical understanding of the social psychological underpinnings of inequality across contexts and across cases. Specifically, this study represents the first step in identifying general processes at work in how status and stigma interact to influence outcomes through differential cultural beliefs and expectations. The status-stigma interaction effect that stems from negative moral judgements about those who are "doubly disadvantaged" may not only apply to the two cases tested here, but possibly to other combinations of status characteristics and social stigmas. That these two theoretical tenets – the status-stigma interaction and the mediating role of moral expectations – applied to two very different status-stigma pairings provides compelling support for a new theory with broad applicability.

However, it remains to be seen how well this framework will hold up to explain other sets of characteristics. One of the central limitations of this study is that only two sets of status and stigmatized characteristics were studied. More general conclusions will depend on replication across other characteristics. And it may prove difficult to develop a one-size-fits-all framework for understanding how such varied individual characteristics intersect and influence inequality. Both status characteristics and stigmas are complex sociocultural constructs associated with an array of different meanings and beliefs that may introduce unique variables and mechanisms. Existing research on status and stigma notes these complexities and the challenges they pose to theorizing across the two literatures. In their bridging piece that examines the interrelation of status and stigma, Lucas and Phelan (2012:327) warn that "not all stigmas are created equal," and that different pairings of status characteristics and stigmatized attributes may operate under different processes. This caution applies to this study as well, especially as the magnitude of certain effects differed even across the results of the two experiments presented here.

Given these limitations and complexities, findings should be viewed as preliminary support for components of the theoretical logic developed in this dissertation, but not as conclusive evidence of this theoretical process. It will be necessary in future research to test additional combinations of status characteristics and stigmas to draw more general conclusions about how they interact. In extensions of this work, it will be particularly important not just to examine additional stigmatized attributes that fall within the category studied in this dissertation – what Goffman (1963) calls "individual blemishes of character" – but also other types of stigmas. These other types of stigmas

include bodily stigmas like physical disability and tribal stigmas such as those related to religious affiliation.

Future research that examines other status-stigma pairings will also help to further assess the role of moral expectations as a mechanism of bias. In the two cases selected for this study, moral expectations play a mediating role in the relationship between the status-stigma interaction and workplace outcomes. However, the extent of the mediation varies across cases. For race and criminal history, moral expectations fully mediate the status-stigma interaction on several outcomes. That is, moral expectations fully explain the combined effects of race and criminal history in the likelihood to be recommended hire and promotion. For gender and mental illness, however, moral expectations only partially mediate the interaction. As such, it is likely that the specific interplay between gender and mental illness activates other beliefs or expectations – in addition to moral expectations – that also operate to affect outcomes. Again, as Lucas and Phelan (2012) warn, there may be multiple and unique sets of expectations and beliefs associated with different stigmatized attributes.

The myriad of unique beliefs associated with different stigmatized characteristics might make replication across other status-stigma combinations difficult. However, there is general agreement in the stigma literature that many different stigmatized characteristics have a moral dimension (Goffman 1963, Corrigan 2000, Link and Phelan 2001). Indeed, Goffman (1963) views the capacity of stigma to distinguish people as immoral or as "not quite human" as one of its defining features. Thus, it is possible that moral expectations will operate as a general mechanism of bias across a variety of cases, but that the *strength* of those expectations may vary with other beliefs or responses

associated with particular stigmas. Still, identifying moral expectations as a new mechanism that can potentially explain divergent status and stigma processes is a significant step forward in bridging the two literatures and explaining root causes of real-world inequality.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND BROADER IMPACTS

This dissertation begins by presenting a theoretical question with practical relevance: do status characteristics and social stigmas interact generally to diminish outcomes for individuals who are both status-disadvantaged and stigmatized? If so, what are the precise mechanisms that drive this "double disadvantage"? These questions present an intriguing puzzle as current theories and frameworks related to the status and stigma literatures lead to inconsistent – and in some cases empirically incorrect – predictions about how these characteristics combine to affect outcomes.

Substantive research that considers cases where certain devalued states of status characteristics combine with stigmatized attributes suggest that the characteristics interact to significantly diminish outcomes in consequential social contexts. Devah Pager's (2003, 2007) pioneering work, discussed throughout this study, provides a striking example. For the job seekers in her audit study, being black resulted in an intensification of the stigma of criminal history in the labor market. We see a similar pattern with a combination like gender and mental illness: that mental illness interlocks with qualities associated with femininity in ways that increase negative judgements and result in disproportionate disadvantage (Wirth & Bodenhausen 2009, Schur 1984).

Although it may seem intuitive to social scientists that these combinations of attributes would diminish outcomes, these patterns are at odds with the literatures most closely associated with status characteristics and stigmas. For instance, Lucas and Phelan (2012) argue that many processes of stigmatization mirror status organizing processes, and that status characteristics and stigmas may be more similar than they are different. However, as I have argued, their study does not attend closely to certain tenets of SCT,

particularly its aggregation assumptions for how multiple pieces of status information combine to influence expectations. If stigmatized characteristics followed the aggregation assumptions of the theory – the inconsistency and attenuation effects in particular – we would expect the opposite patterns of what scholars observe empirically when a stigma is combined with a status-disadvantage: that a stigma would be relatively *less* of a disadvantage when paired with a devalued status state and relatively *more* of a disadvantage when paired with a valued status state. Of course, this is not what the aforementioned substantive studies suggest. In the cases of race-criminal history and gender-mental illness, there is evidence that the combination of a stigma with a devalued status state dramatically reduces individual outcomes. This is the first study to generate evidence that suggests this interaction is a general phenomenon, and one that deviates from current status order logic. In fact, findings suggest that the status-stigma interaction diverges even more dramatically from status processes than anticipated – initiating an entirely unique process.

Reconciling these theoretical issues may greatly improve our ability to construct targeted interventionist strategies. With previous scholarship that posits opposite predictions about how status and stigma interact and does not adequately specify the particular mechanisms at play in how they drive inequality, it is unlikely that research-informed efforts to stymie status and stigma-related bias and discrimination will be successful. The unintended consequences of recent "Ban the Box" policies discussed in the introduction of this dissertation are case in point. Despite their intention to reduce employment discrimination for job seekers with a criminal record, "Ban the Box" resulted in increased discrimination against minority applicants (Agan and Starr 2016,

Doleac and Hansen 2016). As prominent social scientist Sendhil Mullainathan (2016) explains in an article in the *New York Times*, "when we try to end discrimination without addressing the underlying causes of discriminatory behavior, our efforts may accomplish little — and may even backfire."

This study isolates and experimentally evaluates moral expectations as one such underlying cause of discriminatory behavior that could apply – not just to minority job seekers with criminal records – but to many other cases of disadvantage related to status and stigma. By and large, efforts to reduce bias against individuals who are "doubly disadvantaged" on the bases discussed here do not attend to these widely held moral beliefs. Instead, intervention programs like job services organizations for ex-offenders or people with disabilities tend to focus on skills training or resume building (Visher et al. 2005). While these kinds of programs can equip job seekers with necessary skills, they often do not help them to signal other – sometimes more important – qualities. In their examination of vetting processes in hiring committees, McDonald and colleagues (forthcoming) find that employers are increasingly concerned with cultural signifiers of moral character – and that they go to great lengths to assess what they call the "moral performativity" (drive, deservingness, authenticity) of candidates. These moral evaluations have serious implications for stratification along the lines of race, gender, and class. And as I show in this study, they can be an even greater barrier for individuals who are disadvantaged on these status characteristics *and* stigmatized.

Future research might use findings from this study to investigate how to mitigate these detrimental moral judgements. For instance, recent work that examines strategies of stigma management among privileged groups suggests that the construction of a

"restorative narrative" can help to deflect negative moralized beliefs (Pfaffendorf, forthcoming). This research finds that, in some cases, stigma can be reworked into a mark of redemption or overcomeance through a strategic personal narrative that carefully couches past circumstances. However, this process, as it has been observed, is closely linked to privilege; cultural sociologists find that individuals who are status-advantaged along multiple axes – young, white, middle- to upper-class men in particular – have more "flexibility of identity" to incorporate and capitalize on subordinate or stigmatized elements of their identities (Hughey 2012, Bridges and Pascoe 2014, Pfaffendorf forthcoming). Without the resources and cultural tools afforded by privilege to construct an effective "restorative narrative," it may prove difficult to for individuals to adopt such a strategy.

However, criminologists have also recently emphasized the importance of "transformation narratives" in rates of desistance and recidivism among ex-offenders (Liem and Richardson 2014). Learning to present a transformation narrative focused on projecting a "good" core self and "generative" motivations – a desire to give back or contribute – helped to facilitate several important aspects of successful re-entry for previously incarcerated individuals. With the increasing emphasis on "moral performativity" in the workplace (McDonald et al., forthcoming), these transformation (Liem and Richardson 2014) or restorative (Pfaffendorf, forthcoming) narratives could also help in employment. Indeed, McAdams (2006) argues that moral narratives that focus on struggle, hardship, and overcoming obstacles are especially salient among individuals in positions of power. This is because they mesh well with middle- and

upper-class sensibilities and ideas of transformation in the face of personal hardship (McAdams 2006, 2014).

Given these recent insights, moral narratives of this variety could potentially operate as a valuable tool for mitigating negative moral beliefs held by managers or other white-collar professionals. Future research might test the effectiveness of socially restorative narratives in experimental vignettes, perhaps using a hiring scenario like that used in this study and others (Correll et al. 2007, Benard and Correll 2010). In addition, this sort of intervention could be examined in applied research in contexts like job services programs where individuals could be explicitly coached in different narrative strategies.

To conclude, this dissertation represents the first systematic attempt to resolve inconsistencies across the status and stigma literatures to better explain and address real-world patterns of bias and discrimination – delineating distinct processes in how status and stigma produce inequality. Findings generally support the main argument that stigmatized characteristics are distinct from status characteristics and clearly diverge from status organizing processes. Across the two experiments, individuals who are both status-disadvantaged and stigmatized experience disproportionate disadvantage on several consequential outcomes. In the workplace experimental scenario, both black applicants with a criminal record and female applicants with a mental illness are less likely to be recommended for hire and for eventual promotion. And the disadvantage related to the status-stigma interaction is driven, at least in part, by moral expectations. Each of these findings – that there is a general interaction effect and that this effect is

mediated by moral expectations – depart from current explanations of how status and stigma relate.

These divergent findings pave the way for a new, testable framework for understanding how status and stigma operate as two of the most significant sources of individual inequality. This framework represents a theoretical contribution to the status and stigma literatures in social psychology, as well as to research on inequality more generally. In addition, it also reveals fruitful avenues for future interventionist work by pinpointing moral expectations as a precise mechanism to target in efforts to reduce status and stigma-related bias. However, this dissertation is only a first step in examining issues that span the status and stigma literatures. Future research must consider additional status and stigmatized characteristics to assess the scope and applicability of the current framework.

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE OF RESEARCH INSTRUMENT FOR EXPERIMENT

Note: Two mock resumes are provided here. The others were identical, only varying by the manipulated variables described in Chapter 4.

PAGE 1:

Welcome!

Please review the study instructions by clicking the next arrow.

PAGE 2:

Study Background

The study you are invited to participate in today is a joint project involving a team of researchers at The University of Arizona and a digital marketing and information services company based in Tempe, Arizona. We will refer to the company by the pseudonym "Gravian." We do this to maintain the anonymity of the organization while they are still piloting this study.

We put this team of researchers and employers together based on mutual interests: we as researchers are interested in how companies make hiring decisions and Gravian is in the first stage of a study where they seek out community feedback on company decisions. They are particularly interested in hearing from younger people to promote fresh and innovative ideas. Already, they have seen beneficial effects of these "crowd-sourced" decisions in their workplace -- higher morale, lower turn-over, and increased productivity.

To help us learn even more about hiring decisions and creating a positive work environment, we will ask you to help us examine and rank applicants for an open Sales Specialist position at Gravian. You will rank between 1 and 4 job applicants randomly selected from our applicant pool. Your evaluations will be used as one measure of applicant quality.

PAGE 3:

Company Profile

Gravian is an insight driven information services company headquartered in Tempe, AZ. We are one of the leading providers of information resources and wireless communication innovations to mass market, business, government, and wholesale customers.

PAGE 4:

Compensation for your Input

Gravian has agreed to participate in this study in exchange for feedback gathered from the University of Arizona research team on its job applicants. Your input in the job search is of the highest value to us. As such, we ask that you please review each applicant carefully and thoroughly, and give your complete attention to ranking and evaluating them. This will help us to select the best candidates for the job.

In exchange for your time, concentration, and effort in ranking these candidates, you will receive $20 cash compensation at the end of the session today. Additionally, there is a $45 bonus for participants who recommend a candidate who is eventually hired by Gravian.

PAGE 5:

Informed Consent and Confidentiality Agreement

Before proceeding to the job applicant materials, we ask that you please review the consent form and the confidentiality agreement on the desk in front of you. The consent form is to confirm that your participation is voluntary. After you have read and signed the forms, a researcher will be in to collect them from you.

If you have questions or concerns before agreeing to participate in this study, please raise your hand and a researcher will be in shortly to assist you.

After you have signed the form, **please wait for the researcher to give you a study key to enter below**. You may then begin.

PAGE 6:

Job Description

Position: Sales Specialist

Company Profile:

Gravian is an insight driven information services company headquartered in Tempe, AZ. We are one of the leading providers of information resources and wireless communication innovations to mass market, business, government, and wholesale customers.

Major Duties:

Gravian is currently seeking a sales specialist to evaluate performance and increase sales. The applicant will track sales performance using existing templates. The applicant will work to provide insight into new sales initiatives. In addition, the employee will monitor various sales strategies and promotions. The applicant must also assure client satisfaction, and forge and maintain relationships with clients.

Qualifications:

Applicants must have at least one year of sales experience. All other job-related training will be provided.

Pay, Benefits and Work Schedule:

This is a permanent full-time position. The applicant will be eligible for health and life insurance, annual vacation and sick leave, and will be offered a choice of a pension plan out of two options. Salary will be commensurate with experience, but will likely be in the range of $25,000-55,000.

PAGE 7:

Next, you will review the first application. You may jot down details about the applicant on the note sheets provided.

PAGE 8:

Jamal Washington
801 N Aurthur Ave.
Holston, AZ 85361
(623) 432-0872

Career Objectives

Sales associate with knowledge of advertising seeking a sales position in information services. Experienced in various sales techniques and in working toward sales targets and quotas. Eventual career objective is a management advertising and sales position.

Experience

April 2013-July 2014: Sales Associate, Inbound Inc., Holston, AZ.

- Assisted with sales campaigns
- Aided in tracking sales
- Met sales quotas
- Established lasting relationships with clients
- Helped clients with purchasing needs and questions

March 2012-April 2013: Retail Associate, Goldman's Paper Supplies, Ironwood, AZ.

- Provided excellent customer service
- Made product and promotional suggestions based on customer needs to increase sales
- Arranged products to best display and promote sales
- Recorded and maintained inventory logs
- Assisted with store organization

Areas of Expertise

Strategic sales
Communications
Consumer relations
Microsoft Office
Presentation skills

PAGE 9:

Notes from the Interview

This applicant was interviewed in a preliminary round by a trained Gravian interviewer. Below are the notes from the interview:

I interviewed Mr. Washington on the 16th. He worked in sales for roughly two years. Through this experience, he has gained the background necessary for this position. He is outgoing and enthusiastic about the position. He currently resides in Holston, Arizona.

*INTERVIEWER NOTE: It came up in the interview that Mr. Washington has a criminal record, having recently served time in a prison facility.

PAGE 10:

Initial Impressions Survey

We are interested in how people form first impressions of job applicants, making important decisions from little information. We'd like you to think about the applicant you just reviewed and give us your first impressions of them. Please try to respond with your first, uncensored impressions. You will complete one survey for each applicant.

First, please enter the first and last name of the previous applicant:

PAGE: 11

Initial Impressions Survey

Please rank the previous applicant according to your first impressions on the following set of characteristics important to the workplace environment at Gravian. You may rank the applicant on each scale by filling in the circle on the 9-point scale that corresponds to how strongly you think they would exhibit the characteristic. **Be sure to read each scale individually as the meanings of the words on either end are not always the same.**

Please rate the applicant on the following traits by circling the number on each scale that you think best describes the applicant.

Extremely Responsible	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Irresponsible
Extremely Trustworthy	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Untrustworthy
Extremely Incapable	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Capable
Extremely Dishonest	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Honest
Extremely Efficient	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Inefficient
Extremely Unskilled	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Skilled
Extremely Rigid	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Flexible
Extremely Strong Willed	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Weak Willed
Extremely Unreasonable	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Unreasonable
Extremely Unintelligent	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Intelligent
Extremely Independent	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Dependent
Extremely Volatile	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Stable
Extremely Confident	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Unconfident
Extremely Lazy	1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9	Extremely Hardworking

PAGE 12:

Pros and Cons

Now we would like you to list the pros and cons for the applicant based on your first impressions. We realize that this is difficult to do with so little information, but research indicates that this is an important step that employers take in making hiring decisions. You may list up to six pros and up to six cons -- you may choose how many of each are necessary to list (you do not have to fill out all six, but please fill out at least three for each).

Pros	Cons

PAGE 13:

Before making an overall assessment of the previous applicant, you will now review another applicant we are considering for this position. You may jot down details about the next applicant on a new note sheet.

PAGE 14:

Tyrone Jefferson
2053 Hennepin Ave.
Glenn, AZ 85132
(602) 558-5310

BUSINESS OBJECTIVES

A results-oriented sales associate skilled in sales strategies and performance-based sales. Looking to combine my strengths in sales and marketing specialist position. Long-term goals include a manager or administrative position in sales and marketing.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Lift Brands, Glenn, AZ (March 2015 – December 2016)

Sales Team Member

-Met sales targets
-Monitored and reported sales performance
-Made connections with clients
-Assisted management with scheduling and client meetings and calls
-Maintained merchandise inventory

Myer Trading Co., Freemont, AZ (January 2014 - February 2015)

Sales Associate

- Recommended products to drive sales
- Ensured outstanding customer support
- Re-arranged sales floor plan to boost sales
- Built relationships with customers
- Explained sales and promotions

SKILLS

Customer service, product promotions, Microsoft Office, performance-based sales, problem solving

PAGE 15:

Notes from the Interview

This applicant was interviewed in a preliminary round by a trained Gravian interviewer. Below are the notes from the interview:

I talked with Mr. Jefferson last Thursday. He is originally from Freemont, Arizona. Mr. Jefferson has worked in two sales positions. Thus he has the qualifications preferred in our open position. He is an energetic person and is excited about working for Gravian.

PAGE 16 – 19: INITIAL IMPRESSIONS SURVEY AND PROS AND CONS*

*Same as for previous applicant

PAGE 20:

Final Applicant Evaluations*

Now that you have provided your initial impressions of each candidate, we ask that you reexamine each "application packet" by clicking forward before making a final evaluation of each applicant.

While you go back over the application materials, imagine that you are an employer and you have narrowed the pool down to these applicants and you must decide whether or not to hire one of the applicants and, if so, which one. At this point, it is important to consider how they might compare not only to each other, but also to other employees who work for Gravian. You will complete one evaluation survey for each applicant you reviewed.

*Participants were able to re-review each candidate

PAGE 21:

Applicant Evaluation Sheet*

Now that you have provided your initial impressions of each candidate, we ask that you reexamine each applicant file. Imagine now that you are an employer and you have narrowed the pool of applicants down to those that are in front of you and you must decide whether or not to hire one of the applicants and, if so, which one. At this point, it is important to consider how they might compare not only to each other, but also to other employees that work for Gravian. You will complete one survey for each applicant in front of you.

1. Based on your first impressions of the applicant, please give us an overall ranking of how dependable you think he or she would be in this position?

Very Dependable *1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9* *Very undependable*

2. If Gravian were to hire this candidate, what do you think is the likelihood that she or he would be promoted in the next five years? (please circle the corresponding number).

Will certainly receive a promotion *1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9* *Will certainly not receive a promotion*

3. Gravian offers a series of management training courses for employees that it believes show strong advancement potential. If Gravian were to hire this candidate, do you think she or he should be recommended for advanced management training (please check the appropriate blank)?

_____ *Yes*

_____ *No*

4. It is important to Gravian to foster professional, but also friendly relationships among employees. How well do you think the applicant would fit in with other employees in this collegial environment?

Would fit in very well *1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9* *Would not fit in at all*

5. If Gravian were to hire this candidate, what annual salary would you recommend (in dollars)? Salaries for this type of position typically range from $25,000-$55,000 per year.

$_____

6. Please give us an overall ranking of how well you think the applicant will perform in this position:

Will exceed expectations for performance	*1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9*	*Will not meet expectations for performance*

7. Based on all of the materials you have reviewed, please tell us to what degree you recommend hiring this candidate:

Strongly recommend for hire	*1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9*	*Strongly recommend against hire*

*Form provided for each mock applicant

PAGE 22:

Closing Questionnaire*

Now, we would like to ask you a few other questions about the candidates and the process you used to evaluate them.

1. Assume you can only recommend hiring one of the candidates you evaluated today. Which candidate would you recommend?

2. Please tell us why you chose this candidate. Why did you prefer him or her to the other candidate(s)?

3. If you did not recommend any candidate, please tell us why.

4. Please list the criteria you used to evaluate the candidates in the order of their importance. List your most important criteria after the number "1" and then list other criteria, up to 6, in order of decreasing importance to you.

Ranked Criteria

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

*Form provided for each mock applicant

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